A/67/396 recommendations. Ms. Prost nonetheless took the view that her comprehensive reports should address, to the defined standard, the question whether the continued listing was justified. Resolution 1989 (2011) recognizes and now endorses this practice and gives the Ombudsperson a mandate to make consequential recommendations regarding processed delisting requests. 49 29. The second shortcoming was that a consensus of the Committee was required for delisting. The most far-reaching change introduced by resolution 1989 (2011) was to reverse this consensus presumption. A delisting recommendation by the Ombudsperson now takes effect automatically 60 days after the Committee completes its consideration of the comprehensive report, unless the Committee decides otherwise by consensus. If there is no consensus, any member of the Committee may refer the delisting request to the Security Council (the “trigger mechanism” procedure). 50 30. According to the latest available figures, there are currently 238 individuals and 68 entities on the Consolidated List. The Ombudsperson has received 30 delisting petitions, of which 19 cases have completed the delisting process, resulting in the delisting of 16 individuals and 24 entities (one petition concerned 1 individual and 23 related entities). Without seeing the underlying information, it is difficult for the Special Rapporteur to draw firm conclusions from the raw data. All that can be said with confidence is that the high proportion of petitions that have resulted in delisting tends to suggest that the Ombudsperson process has been effective in those cases that have so far been processed. At the same time, it underlines in stark terms the fallibility potential of the entries on the Consolidated List, thereby reinforcing the imperative need for fair and clear listing and delisting procedures that meet international minimum standards. 31. Prior to the amendments made by resolution 1989 (2011), the mandate of the Ombudsperson had been assessed for compatibility with minimum standards of due process by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 51 the former Special Rapporteur, 52 the General Court of the European Union, 53 and the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom. 54 While welcoming the introduction of an independent element to the procedure, they each concluded that the mandate of the Ombudsperson under resolution 1904 (2009) failed adequately to address the due process-related concerns previously expressed about the regime, identifying 10 key objections: (i) the mandate of the Ombudsperson did not confer a power to overturn decisions of the Committee; (ii) the Committee therefore continued to act as judge in its own cause; (iii) delisting required a consensus within the Committee; (iv) the Ombudsperson lacked a power of recommendation; (v) disclosure of information to the Ombudsperson or the Committee was subject to the unfettered discretion of __________________ 49 50 51 52 53 54 12-52254 See Security Council resolution 1989 (2011), para. 21. See Security Council resolution 1989 (2011), para. 23. The same procedure is now to be followed where the designating State submits a delisting request; ibid., para. 27. See A/HRC/16/50, paras. 17-22 and 44. See A/65/258, paras. 55-56; see also Martin Scheinin, “Is the ECJ Ruling in Kadi Incompatible with International Law?”, in Yearbook of European Law, vol. 28 (Oxford University Press, 2010). See Case T-85/09, Yassin Abdullah Kadi v. European Commission, General Court (Seventh Chamber), 30 September 2010 [2011] CMLR 24, para. 128. See Her Majesty’s Treasury (Respondent) v. Mohammed Jabar Ahmed and others (FC) (Appellants) [2010] UKSC 2, [2010] 2 AC 534, paras. 78, 80-81 and 239. 13