CCPR/C/125/D/2345/2014 Covenant based on his conversion from Islam to Christianity and therefore finds the author’s claim under article 7 admissible. In this context, the Committee notes that the other grounds for seeking asylum presented by the author to the State party’s authorities at different stages of the asylum proceedings, namely his fear of the reaction of his maternal uncle and his uncle’s spouse upon return to Afghanistan, as well as his fear of the retaliation by a pimp whom he allegedly stabbed in the throat with a knife, are not part of the present communication to the Committee (see para. 5.2. above). As for the allegations concerning a violation of article 18, the Committee considers that they cannot be dissociated from the author’s allegations under article 7 with regard to the risk of harm that he faces in Afghanistan as a result of his conversion from Islam to Christianity, which must be determined on the merits.26 7.8 Therefore, the Committee declares the communication admissible, insofar as it raises issues under articles 7 and 18 of the Covenant, based on the author’s conversion from Islam to Christianity, and proceeds with its consideration of the merits. Consideration of the merits 8.1 The Committee has considered the communication in the light of all the information made available to it by the parties, as required under article 5 (1) of the Optional Protocol. 8.2 The Committee notes the author’s claim that his forcible return to Afghanistan would result in a risk of treatment contrary to article 7 of the Covenant based on his conversion from Islam to Christianity. 8.3 The Committee recalls its general comment No. 31 (2004) on the nature of the general legal obligation imposed on States parties to the Covenant, in which it refers to the obligation of States parties not to extradite, deport, expel or otherwise remove a person from their territory when there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of irreparable harm such as that contemplated by articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant (para. 12). The Committee has also indicated that the risk must be personal 27 and that there is a high threshold for providing substantial grounds to establish that a real risk of irreparable harm exists. 28 Thus, all relevant facts and circumstances must be considered, including the general human rights situation in the author’s country of origin.29 8.4 The Committee recalls that it is generally for the organs of States parties to examine the facts and evidence of the case in question in order to determine whether such a risk exists,30 unless it can be established that the assessment was clearly arbitrary or amounted to a manifest error or denial of justice.31 8.5 The Committee notes that it is uncontested in the present communication that the author was baptized on 13 October 2013 and regularly attended church services in Denmark between June 2013 and his forcible return to Afghanistan in February 2014. It also notes the finding of the Refugee Appeals Board that it could not accept as a fact that the author’s conversion to Christianity was genuine, despite the existence of a certificate of baptism and a memorandum prepared by a minister of the Kronborgvejens Church Centre. The Board specifically observed in this respect that, during the original asylum proceedings, the author had not disclosed his interest in Christianity – which had arisen already during his stay in Turkey prior to his entry into Denmark, according to the request to reopen the case – whether to the police, the Danish Immigration Service, his legal counsel or the Board. In its assessment of the information on the author’s conversion, the Board has also taken into account, as appears from the reasoning of its decision of 16 January 2012, that during the asylum proceedings the author had given elaborate and inconsistent statements on his 26 27 28 29 30 31 14 For example, X v. Denmark, para. 8.4. K. v. Denmark (CCPR/C/114/D/2393/2014), para. 7.3; P.T. v. Denmark (CCPR/C/113/D/2272/2013), para. 7.2; and X v. Denmark, para. 9.2. X v. Sweden (CCPR/C/103/D/1833/2008), para. 5.18. Ibid. See also X v. Denmark, para. 9.2. See Pillai et al. v. Canada (CCPR/C/101/D/1763/2008), para. 11.4 and Z.H. v. Australia (CCPR/C/107/D/1957/2010), para. 9.3. For example, K. v. Denmark, para. 7.4.