CAT/OP/GBR/ROSP/1 line managed by civil servants of the Ministry of Justice, which also had operational responsibility for most of the places monitored by the Independent Monitoring Boards. 20 41. The Subcommittee recommends that the authorities of the United Kingdom review the statutes of the Independent Monitoring Boards and the lay observers to ensure their full independence and to prevent actual or potential conflicts of interest in their roles within the national preventive mechanism. 42. The Subcommittee reiterates that the independence of the national preventive mechanism, both actual and perceived, should be fostered by a transparent process of selection and appointment of members who are independent and do not hold a position that could raise questions of conflict of interest.21 In that regard, the Subcommittee notes that the Chief Inspector of Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Prisons is appointed by the Secretary of State upon recommendation from the Ministry of Justice. Given that the Inspectorate functions as the coordinating body of the national preventive mechanism, the perceptions of State involvement could be detrimental to the credibility of the whole mechanism. In the view of the Subcommittee, this appointment by the executive branch creates a loophole that calls for further reflection and strengthening of safeguards for independence. 43. The Subcommittee calls upon the authorities of the United Kingdom to ensure the functional independence of Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Prisons and the independence of its personnel through a transparent process of selection and appointment of the Chief Inspector of the Inspectorate. The Subcommittee also recommends that, in compliance with the Optional Protocol, the State party ensure that members of the national preventive mechanism are independent and do not hold a position that could raise questions of actual or perceived conflict of interest. D. Human and financial resources 44. The Subcommittee was informed that some members of the national preventive mechanism faced challenges with the budgets necessary to carry out their mechanism functions. This was the result of a range of factors, including recent budget cuts, and budgets for the mechanism’s work within the 21 bodies not being ring-fenced to carry out preventive work and thus being allocated alongside competing priorities. 45. Bearing in mind that the Optional Protocol is unequivocal on the need for the State party to allocate specific resources to national preventive mechanism (art. 18 (1) and (3)), so as to guarantee the operational independence of the mechanism,22 and that the Subcommittee guidelines on national preventive mechanisms indicate explicitly that the mechanism should enjoy complete financial and operational autonomy, 23 the Subcommittee recommends the specific earmarked allocation of funds to the function of the mechanism for each of its members. 46. In addition, while noting that staffing for the national preventive mechanism secretariat recently increased from two part-time roles to one part-time Head of Secretariat and one full-time Assistant Coordinator, the Subcommittee believes that resources provided to the secretariat remain insufficient, the more so considering the complex institutional structure of the mechanism. 47. The Subcommittee recommends that the State party increase the financial and human resources of the national preventive mechanism secretariat, in order to guarantee its independence, as per the Optional Protocol provisions. 20 21 22 23 Eighth Annual Report of the United Kingdom’s National Preventive Mechanism, 1 April 2016–31 March 2017, p. 58. Guidelines on national preventive mechanisms, paras. 16 and 18. Ibid., para. 8. Ibid., para. 12. 9