rules be approved by a majority of band electors, and that certain specified groups of persons be included in the membership list. declaration: (a) that Bill CA31 is inconsistent with section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, to the extent that it limits, or denies, the aboriginal and implied treaty rights of Indian Bands to determine their own membership: or (b) that the imposition of additional members on the plaintiff Bands pursuant to the Bill, without the Bands’ consent, constitutes a violation of the right to freedom of association, guaranteed by section 2(d) of the Charter. Evidence-gathering examinations were initiated early in 1989, but because of several interlocutory motions and the large number of parties seeking to intervene, they have not been completed. The State party expresses its hope that the matter will go on trial late in 1991. Similar issues have been raised in the cases of Martel v. Chief Omeasoo before the Federal Court, Trial Division, and of Chief Omeasoo v. The Queen before the Federal Court, Appeals Division: the State party indicates, however, that the plaintiffs in thes e cases are not currently actively pursuing their actions. 4.9 In 1987 the authors submitted their membership rules for approval to the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development. By letter dated 25 January 1988, the Chief of the Whispering Pines Band was advised that the membership rules were not acceptable because they excluded certain specified groups, such as women who lost their entitlement to band membership as a result of marriage to nonIndians, their minor children, and others. The Minister invited the Band to amend its membership rules in accordance with the reconditions, and re-submit the amended rules for approval by the Department. The two year deadline to which the Band refers does not apply to re-submission of proposed rules. Therefore, the Minister’s offer to the Band remains valid and would provide a remedy to the alleged violations of the Covenant. 4.7 In respect of allegedly prohibitive costs of litigation, the State party argues that the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development has provided funding to various of the parties involved in the cases discussed above. In Twinn, approximately $55,000 was given to the Native Council of Canada and Indian Rights for Indian Women, to assist in the preparation of court documentation. In September 1988, the government approved a Bill C-31 Litigation Funding Program. Since funds have already been granted to certain litigants in the Twinn case pursuant to this programme, it is, however, unlikely that further funds will be made available for the litigation of identical issues between different parties, at least until the Twinn case is resolved. The State also contends that the authors may seek financial assistance through the Court Challenges Program, which was established in 1985 to assist litigants in cases involving important and novel issues relating to the applicability of the Charter’s equality clause to federal laws. The State party notes that there is no indication whether the authors have sought financial assistance under this programme from its independent administering body. Finally, the State party refers to the existence of a Test Case Funding Programme, but observes that there is no indication that the authors applied for assistance under it. 5.1 In response to the State party’s submission, the authors assert that since the complaint arises directly from the State party’s efforts to implement a previous decision of the Committee involving the same State, the same category of persons and the same basic principles, it constitutes a case of “continuing jurisdiction”. They invoke the principles of natural justice, that the author of a communication may return to the Committee for a clarification and reaffirmation of its Views without first having to re-litigate the matter before domestic tribunals. The authors believe that not only the author of a communication could seek further action following the transmittal of the Committee’s Views, but also other individuals, similarly placed and similarly affected, should be entitled to address the Committee for clarifications of the application of its Views to them. 5.2 The authors argue that the Committee’s Views were not properly implemented, as Bill C-31 merely replaced gender restrictions by racial ones, and that it would be unreasonably formalistic to require prior exhaustion of domestic remedies in these circumstances. 5.3 In respect of the availability of domestic remedies, the authors reiterate their view that litigation would not afford them an “effective and available” remedy and that the cost and time required for judicial resolution would not be 4.8 Bill C-31 also allows Indian Bands to determine their own membership rules if two conditions are met. These conditions are that the 20