themselves that the court did not hear them. The State party further contends that article 14, paragraph 3(e), does not cover the language used before a criminal jurisdiction by witnesses called on behalf of or against the accused and that, in any case, witnesses are not entitled, under the Covenant or under article of 407 Penal of the Procedure, Code to rights broader than those conferred upon the accused. stipulates that whenever the accused or a witness does not sufficiently master French, the President of the Court must, ex officio, request the services of an interpreter. In the application of article 407, the President of the Court has a considerable margin of discretion, based on a detailed analysis of the individual case and all the relevant documents. This has been confirmed by the Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation on several occasions.1 It adds that article 407 of the Code of Penal Procedure, which stipulates that the language used in criminal proceedings is French, is not only compatible with article 14, paragraph 3 (f), of the Covenant, but goes further in its protection of the rights of the accused, since it requires the judge to provide for the assistance of an interpreter if the accused or a witness has not sufficiently mastered the French language. 4.7 With respect to a violation of article 19, paragraph 2, the State party contends that the authors’ freedom of expression was in no way restricted during the proceedings against them. They were not allowed to express themselves in Breton because they are bilingual. They were at all times at liberty to argue their defence in French, without any requirement to use legal terminology. If the need had arisen, the tribunal itself would have determined the legal significance of the arguments put forth by the authors. 4.5 The State party recalls that the authors and all the witnesses called on their behalf were francophone. In particular, it observes that Mr. Le Bihan did not specifically request the services of an interpreter. The State party further acknowledges that two French courts -those of Guingamp and Lorient in Bretagne allowed, in March 1984 and February 1985 respectively, French citizens of Breton origin to resort to interpreters: it contends, however, that these decisions were exceptions to the rule, and that the Court of Appeal of Rennes as well as the Tribunaux de Grande Instance de Guingamp and Lorient usually refuse to apply them vis-à-vis accused individuals or witnesses who are proficient in French. Accordingly, it is submitted, there can be no question of a violation of article 14, paragraph 3(f). 4.8 As to the alleged violation of article 26, the State party recalls that the prohibition of discrimination is enshrined in article 2 of the French Constitution. It further submits that the prohibition of discrimination laid down in article 26 does not extend to the right of an accused person to choose, in proceedings against him or her, whatever language he or she sees fit to use; rather, it implies that the parties to a case accept and submit to the same constraints. The State party contends that the authors have not sufficiently substantiated their allegation to have been victims of discrimination, and adds that the authors’ argument that an imperfect knowledge of French legal terminology justified their refusal to express themselves in French before the courts is irrelevant for purposes of article 26. The authors were merely requested to express themselves in “basic” French. Furthermore, article 407 of the Code of Penal Procedure, far from operating as discrimination on the grounds of language within the meaning of article 26, ensures the equality of treatment of the accused and of witnesses before the criminal jurisdictions, because all are required to express themselves in French. The sole exception in article 407 of the Code of Penal Procedure concerns accused persons and witnesses who objectively do not understand or speak the language of the court. This distinction is couched on “reasonable and objective criteria” and thus is compatible with article 26 of the Covenant. Finally, the State party charges that the principle of venire contra factum proprium is applicable to 4.6 The State party rejects the authors’ argument that they did not benefit from a fair trial in that the court refused to hear the witnesses called on their behalf, in violation of article 14, paragraph 3(e), of the Covenant. Rather, Mr. Cadoret was able to persuade the court to call these witnesses, and it was of their own volition that they did not testify, Using his discretionary power, the President of the Court found that it was neither alleged nor proved that the witnesses were unable to express themselves in French and that their request for an interpreter was merely intended as a means of promoting the cause of the Breton language. It was therefore owing to the behaviour of the witnesses 1 See, for example, the judgements of the Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation of 21 November 1973 (Motta) and of 30 June 1981 (Fayomi). 45