officer, and the alleged intimidation of witnesses by the same officer, violated the aforementioned provisions; (c) whether the failure of author’s counsel in the re-trial to call witnesses on his behalf violated article 14, paragraph 3 (e); and (d) whether the author’s alleged ill-treatment on death row amounts to violations of articles 7 and 10. irregularities in the administration of justice, or that it would consider itself competent to inquire into the conduct of a criminal case. Such matters, however, are central to the author’s complaint, which does not otherwise raise legal issues of general or public interest. In this context, the Committee notes that the evaluation of evidence and the summing up of relevant legal issues by the judge was neither arbitrary nor-amounted to a denial of justice, and that the judgement of the Court of Appeal clearly addressed the grounds of appeal. 8.2 Concerning the substance of Mr. Collins’ allegations, the Committee regrets that several requests for clarifications notwithstanding (requests which were reiterated in two interlocutory decisions adopted after the decision on admissibility of 2 November 1988), the State party has confined itself to the observation that the facts relied upon by the author seek to raise issues of facts and evidence that the Committee is not Competent to evaluate. The Committee cannot but interpret this as the State party’s refusal to cooperate under article 4, paragraph 2, of the Optional Protocol. Article 4, paragraph 2, of the Optional Protocol enjoins a State party to investigate in good faith all the allegations of violations of the Covenant made against it and its judicial authorities, and to make available to the Committee all the information at its The summary dismissal of the author’s allegations, as in the present case, does not meet the requirements of article 4, paragraph 2. In the circumstances, due weight must be given to the author’s allegations, to the extent that they have been credibly substantiated. 7.5 In the particular circumstances of the case, therefore, the Committee finds that a petition for leave to appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council would have no prospect of success; accordingly, it does not constitute an effective remedy within the meaning of the Optional Protocol. 7.6 Similar considerations apply to the author’s possibility of obtaining the redress sought by applying for constitutional redress in the Supreme (Constitutional) Court. A remedy is not “available” within the meaning of the Optional Protocol where, as in the instant case, no legal aid is made available in respect of constitutional motions, and no lawyer is willing to represent the author for this purpose on a pro bono basis. The Committee further reiterates that in capital punishment cases, legal aid should not only be made available; it should also enable counsel to prepare his client’s defence in circumstances that can ensure justice.3 8.3 The Committee does not accept the State party’s contention that the communication merely seeks to raise issues of facts and evidence which the Committee does not have the competence to evaluate. It is the Committee’s established jurisprudence that it is in principle for the appellate courts of States parties to the Covenant to evaluate facts and evidence in a particular case or to review specific instructions to the jury by the judge, unless it can be ascertained that the instructions to the jury were clearly arbitrary or amounted to a denial of justice, or that the judge clearly violated his obligation of impartiality.4 In the present case, the Committee has been requested to examine matters in this latter category. After careful consideration of the material before it, the Committee cannot conclude that the remark attributed to Justice G. in the committal 7.7 For the reasons above, the Committee finds that a petition for special leave to appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council and a constitutional motion in the Supreme (Constitutional) Court are not remedies that the author would have to exhaust for purposes of the Optional Protocol. It therefore concludes that there is no reason to reverse its decision on admissibility of 2 November 1986. 8.1 With respect to the alleged violations of the Covenant, four issues are before the Committee: (a) whether the conduct of the author’s re-trial by a judge with a previous involvement in the case violated the author’s rights under article 14, paragraphs 1 and 2, of the Covenant; (b) whether the alleged tampering with members of the jury by the investigating 4 See ibid., Forty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 40 (A/46/40), annex XI, sect. D, communication No. 253/1987 (Paul Kelly v. Jamaica), Views adopted on 8 April 1991, para. 5.13. 3 See ibid., annex IX, sect. J, communication No. 250/1987 (Carlton Reid v. Jamaica), Views adopted on 20 July 1990, para. 13. 58