the Judicial Committee’s decisions in DPP v. Nasralla2 and Riley et al. v. Attorney General of Jamaica,3 where it was held that the Jamaican Constitution was intended to prevent the enactment of unjust laws and not merely unjust treatment under the law. State party’s observations author’s confession is said to have been “inherently unfair”. 3.8 Finally, the author affirms that he is the victim of a violation of article 10 of the Covenant, since the treatment he is subjected to on death row is incompatible with the respect for the inherent dignity of the human person. In this context, ‘he encloses a copy of a report about the conditions of detention on death row at St. Catherine Prison, prepared by a United States non-governmental organization, which describes the deplorable living conditions prevailing on death row. More particularly, the author claims that these conditions put his health at considerable risk, adding that he receives insufficient food, of very low nutritional value, that he has no access whatsoever to recreational or sporting facilities and that he is locked in his cell virtually 24 hours a day. It is further submitted that the prison authorities do not provide for even basic hygienic facilities, adequate diet, medical or dental care, or any type of educational services. Taken together, these conditions are said to constitute a breach of article 10 of the Covenant. The author refers to the Committee’s jurisprudence in this regard.1 4.1 The State party contends that the communication is inadmissible because of the author’s failure to exhaust domestic remedies, since he retains the right, under section 110 of the Jamaican Constitution, to petition the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council for special leave to appeal. In this context, it points out that the rules of procedure of the Judicial Committee do not make a written judgement of the Court of Appeal a prerequisite for a petition for leave to appeal. While rule 4 provides that any petitioner for special leave to appeal must submit the judgement from which leave to appeal is sought, Rule 1 defines “judgement” as “decree order, sentence or decision of any court, judge or judicial officer”. Thus, the State party argues, an order or a decision of the Court of Appeal, as distinct from a reasoned judgement, is a sufficient basis for a petition for special leave to appeal to the Judicial Committee. It adds that the Privy Council has heard petitions on the basis of the order or decision of the Court of Appeal dismissing the appeal. 3.9 In respect of the requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies, the author maintains that although he has not petitioned the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, he should be deemed to have complied with the requirements of article 5, paragraph 2(b), of the Optional Protocol. He notes that pursuant to rule 4 of the Privy Council rules, a written judgement of the Court of Appeal is required if the Judicial Committee is to entertain an appeal. 4.2 With respect to the substance of the author’s allegations, the State party affirms that the facts as presented by the author “seek to raise issues of facts and evidence in the case which the Committee does not have the competence to evaluate”. The State party refers to the Committee’s decisions in communications 290/1988 and 369/1989, in which it had been held that “while article 14 . . . guarantees the right to a fair trial, it is for the appellate courts of States parties to the Covenant to evaluate facts and evidence in a particular case”.4 3.10 The author further points out that he was unaware of the existence of the Note of Oral Judgement until almost three years after the dismissal of his appeal, and counsel adds that the trial transcript obtained in October 1989 is incomplete in material respects, including the summing-up of the judge, which further hampers efforts to prepare properly an appeal to the Privy Council. Subsidiarily, he argues that as almost eight years have already elapsed since his conviction, the pursuit of domestic remedies has been unreasonably prolonged. Finally, he argues that a constitutional motion in the Supreme (Constitutional) Court of Jamaica would inevitably fail, in the light of the precedent set by 2 [1967] 2 All ER, at 161. [1982] 3 All ER, at 469. 4 Decisions of 8 November 1989, 290/1988 (A. W. v. Jamaica), para. 82; 369/1989 (G. S. v. Jamaica), para. 3.2. 3 1 See final Views in para. 12.7 of communication No. 232/1987 (Daniel Pinto v. Trinidad and Tobago), adopted on 20 July 1990. 63