While sharing the view of the Committee that in proceedings for serious crimes, especially capital punishment cases, a fair trial for accused persons must provide them with effective legal counsel if the accused are unable to retain private ,counsel, the responsibility of the State party in providing legal counsel may not go beyond the responsibility to act in good faith in assigning legal counsel to accused individuals. Any errors of judgement by court-appointed counsel cannot be attributed to the State party any more than errors by privately retained counsel can be. In an adversary system of litigation, it is unfortunate that innocent people go to the gallows for mistakes made by their lawyers, just as criminals may escape the gallows simply because their lawyers are clever. This flaw runs deep into the adversary system of litigation applied by the majority of States parties to the Covenant. If court-appointed lawyers are held accountable to a higher degree of responsibility than their private counterparts, and thus the State party is made accountable for any of their own errors of judgement, then, I am afraid, the Committee is applying a double standard. by law to exercise judicial power. A similar right is contained in article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which is applicable to the “lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence, or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so.” The author was arrested and taken into custody on 20 August 1981; he was detained incommunicado. On 15 September 1981 he was charged with murder; only one week later was he brought before a judge. While article 9, paragraph 1, of the Covenant covers all forms of deprivation of liberty by arrest or detention, the scope of application of paragraph 3 is limited to arrests and detentions “on a criminal charge”. It would appear that the State party interprets this provision in the sense that the obligation of the authorities to bring the detainee before a judge or judicial officer does not arise until a formal criminal charge has been served to him. It is, however, abundantly clear from the travaux preparatoires that the formula “on a criminal charge” was meant to cover as broad a scope of application as the corresponding provision in the European Convention. All types of arrest and detention in the course of crime prevention are therefore covered by the provision, whether it is preventive detention, detention pending investigation or detention pending trial. The French version of the paragraph (“détenu du chef d’une infractin pénale”) conveys this meaning better than the English version. I therefore beg to differ with the Committee’s view that the author should be released on account of the alleged errors made by counsel assigned to him for the appeal. I would have been open to suggestions of other remedies to be granted to the complainant, including declaring a mistrial or calling for another judicial review of his case by the appellate court to determine the matter of alleged gross errors made by his counsel. APPENDIX II It should be noted that the words “shall be brought promptly” reflect the original form of habeas corpus (“Habeas corpus NN ad sub-judiciendum”) and order the authorities to bring a detainee before a judge or judicial officer as soon as possible, independently of the latter’s express wishes in this respect. The word “promptly” does not permit a delay of more than two to three days. Individual opinion submitted by Mr. Bertil Wennergren, pursuant to rule 94, paragraph 3, of the Committee’s rules of procedure, concerning the Views of the Committee on communication No. 253/1987, Paul Kelly v. Jamaica As the author was not brought before a judge until about five weeks had passed since his detention, the violation of article 9, paragraph 3, of the Covenant is flagrant. The fact that the author was held incommunicado until he was formally charged deprived him of his right, under article 9, paragraph 4, to file an application of his own for judicial review of his detention by a court. Accordingly, this provision was also violated. I concur in the views expressed in the Committee’s decision. However, in my opinion, the arguments in paragraph 5.6 should be expanded. Anyone deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall, according to article 9, paragraph 4, of the Covenant, be entitled to take proceedings before a court. In addition, article 9, paragraph 3, ensures that anyone arrested or detained on criminal charges shall be brought before a judge or other officer authorized 67