CEDAW/C/55/D/40/2012 4.9 In Z. and T. against the United Kingdom (application No. 27034/05, decision of 28 February 2006), the European Court of Human Rights stated that the extraterritoriality principle should be applied predominantly to violations of article 2 (right to life) and article 3 (prohibition of torture) of the European Convention on Human Rights, and to article 5 (right to liberty and security) and article 6 (right to a fair trial) of the Convention if the person expelled would be at risk of a flagrant violation of those rights in the receiving State. This case was about the alleged violation of article 9 (freedom of thought, conscience and religion) of the Convention in the event that applicants were returned to Pakistan, as they claimed that they would not be able to live there as Christians without risking adverse attention or taking steps to conceal their religion. The Court observed the following: Where however an individual claims that on return to his own country he would be impeded in his religious worship in a manner which falls short of those proscribed levels, the Court considers that very limited assistance, if any, can be derived from article 9 by itself. Otherwise it would be imposing an obligation on Contracting States effectively to act as indirect guarantors of freedom of worship for the rest of world. 4.10 The State party notes that, similarly, article 1 of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, like article 2 of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, stipulates that the Human Rights Committee can receive communications from individuals who are subject to the jurisdiction of a State party and who claim to be victims of a violation of any of the rights set forth in the Covenant by that State party. Like the European Court of Human Rights, the Human Rights Committee has found on a number of occasions that the deportation of persons by States parties to other States that would result in a foreseeable breach of their right to life or of their freedom from torture, as set out in articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant, would entail a violation of their convention rights. However, the Human Rights Committee has never considered a communication on its merits regarding the deportation of a person who feared a “lesser” human rights violation (e.g. violation of a derogable right) in the receiving State. 4.11 Legal obligations against removal to serious violations of human rights are found explicitly in the Convention against Torture and in articles 6 and 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. While the latter provisions have been interpreted by the Human Rights Committee to offer implicit protection against removal to the death penalty and to torture or other serious threats to the life and security of the person, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women does not deal directly (or indirectly) with removal to torture or other serious threats to the life and security of the person. 4.12 The State party submits that it is aware of the position of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, as reflected in its general recommendation No. 19, that gender-based violence is a form of discrimination that impairs or nullifies the enjoyment by women of human rights and fundamental freedoms, such as the right to life, the right not to be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, and the right to security of the person. Nevertheless, this does not change the fact that a State party is responsible only for violations that are committed under its own jurisdiction and cannot be held responsible under the Convention for discrimination occurring under the jurisdiction 8/13 13-42833