CAT/C/46/D/379/2009
10.1 The Committee has considered the communication in the light of all information
made available to it by the parties concerned, in accordance with article 22, paragraph 4, of
the Convention.
10.2 The issue before the Committee is whether the complainants’ removal to the
Democratic Republic of the Congo would constitute a violation of the State party’s
obligation, under article 3 of the Convention, not to expel or return (refouler) a person to a
State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of
being subjected to torture.
10.3 In assessing whether there are substantial grounds for believing that the complainant
would be in danger of being subjected to torture upon return, the Committee must take
account of all relevant considerations, including the existence of a consistent pattern of
gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
The aim of such an analysis is to determine whether the complainant runs a real personal
risk of being subjected to torture in the country to which she would be returned. It follows
that the existence of a pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights in a
country does not as such constitute sufficient reason for determining that a particular person
would be in danger of being subjected to torture on return to that country; additional
grounds must be adduced to show that the individual concerned would be personally at risk.
Conversely, the absence of a consistent pattern of flagrant violations of human rights does
not mean that a person might not be subjected to torture in his or her specific
circumstances11.
10.4 The Committee recalls its General Comment No.1 on article 312, which states that
the Committee is obliged to assess whether there are substantial grounds for believing that
the complainant would be in danger of being subjected to torture were he/she to be
expelled, returned or extradited, the risk of torture must be assessed on grounds that go
beyond mere theory or suspicion. However, the risk does not have to meet the test of being
highly probable. The risk need not be highly probable, but it must be foreseeable, real and
personal, and present, as confirmed by the Committee in its previous decisions13. The
Committee recalls that, while it gives considerable weight to the findings of fact of the
State party's bodies, it is entitled to freely assess the facts of each case, taking into account
the circumstances.
10.5 The Committee notes that the State party has questioned the complainant's
credibility, including the claims related to her involvement in political activity within the
parish, and considered her account of facts as not plausible. It further notes the author's
claim that she has been imprisoned and subjected to torture and rape in the past, and that
her allegations are corroborated by the medical reports provided.
10.6 The Committee observes that, according to the Second joint report of seven United
Nations experts on the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (2010)14 and the
11
Communication No.150/1999, S.L. v. Sweden, decision adopted on 11 May 2001, para.6.3.
12
General Comment No. 1: Implementation of article 3 of the Convention in the context of article 22,
U.N. Doc. A/53/44 (21 November 1997), Annex IX.
13
See, inter alia, Communication No.103/1998, S.M.R. and M.M.R. v. Sweden, decision adopted on 5
May 1999, para. 9.7; Communication No. 203/2002, A.R. v. The Netherlands, decision adopted on 21
November 2003, paragraph 7.3; Communication No. 256/2004, M.Z. v. Sweden, decision adopted on
12 May 2006, para. 9.3; Communication No. 322/2007, Njamba v. Sweden, decision adopted on 14
May 2010, para. 9.4.
14
Second joint report of seven United Nations experts on the situation in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo, 8 March 2010, UN. Doc. A/HRC/13/63;
14