CAT/C/34/D/212/2002 page 6 sense of impunity was validated by the Spanish authorities’ common practice of pardoning individuals accused of torture. The State party should have redressed the wrongs suffered by the complainant and taken steps to ensure that such torture would not happen again. The complainant insists that the pardon granted to the civil guards denies the very existence of the torture and ill-treatment of which he was the victim. Issues and proceedings before the Committee 6.1 Before examining the merits of a communication, the Committee against Torture must determine whether it is admissible under article 22 of the Convention. 6.2 The State party is of the view that the communication is inadmissible because domestic remedies have not been exhausted. It claims that, if the complainant considers that his rights under the Convention have been violated by the pardoning of the three civil guards, he ought to have put this argument to the Spanish courts. The complainant maintains that there were no available and effective means to challenge the granting of a pardon. 6.3 The Committee observes that the State party confined itself to asserting that recent decisions by the courts permit the judicial review of pardons, and that the Convention against Torture can be invoked before the domestic courts; it did not indicate what specific remedies were available to the complainant, nor what degree of judicial review pardons would be subject to. The Committee notes that, although the injured party may not be a party to pardon proceedings in a material sense, he or she can be heard if he or she opposes the pardon, and that, according to the State party, the injured party has no right as such to request that no pardon be allowed. The Committee recalls that it is necessary to exhaust only those remedies that have a reasonable chance of success, and is of the view that, in the present case, the complainant did not have such remedies available. Accordingly, the Committee considers the communication admissible under article 22, paragraph 5 (b), of the Convention. 6.4 The Committee notes that the complainant has alleged violations of articles 2 and 4 of the Convention, maintaining that the State party has failed in its obligations to prevent and punish torture. These provisions apply to the extent that the acts of which the complainant was a victim are considered to be torture within the meaning of article 1 of the Convention. The Committee takes note of the complainant’s allegation that his treatment constituted torture within the meaning of the Convention. In the Committee’s view, however, it is unnecessary to rule on whether the treatment meted out to the complainant was consistent with the concept of torture within the meaning of article 1 of the Convention, since the State party has not contradicted the complainant’s allegation that he was tortured. The Committee notes that the courts that tried the complainant’s case concluded that he had indeed been tortured. The Committee must, however, rule on the State party’s argument that the complainant does not have a right to object to the granting of the pardon, and that the complainant therefore does not qualify as a victim in the meaning of article 22, paragraph 1, of the Convention. The Committee points out that the State party has not denied that the complainant was tortured, allowing criminal proceedings to be brought against the civil guards who injured the complainant and accepting that the treatment suffered by the complainant was described during the trial as torture, and that three people were in principle found guilty.