- Absolute prohibition of use of confessions made in violation of Article 3 ECHR As regards the use, as fact-establishing evidence, of confessions (statements) resulting from torture or other ill-treatment in breach of Article 3 ECHR, this practice renders criminal proceedings as a whole unfair. The European Court has underlined that this applies irrespective of the probative value of the statements and irrespective of whether their use was decisive in securing the defendant’s conviction. (Gäfgen v. Germany [GC], 2010, §166, Ibrahim and Others v. UK [GC], 2016, §254). - Prohibition of use of other incriminating evidence tainted by torture Under the ECtHR case-law (Jalloh v. Germany [GC], 2006, §105), incriminating evidence – whether in the form of a confession or real evidence – obtained as a result of acts of violence or brutality or other forms of treatment which can be characterised as torture – should never be relied on as proof of the victim’s guilt. - Incriminating evidence obtained through other forms of ill-treatment The admission of evidence obtained as a result of an act qualified as inhuman treatment in breach of Article 3, but falling short of torture, may breach Article 6, if it has been shown that the breach of Article 3 had a bearing on the outcome of the proceedings against the defendant, that is, had an impact on their conviction or sentence (El Haski v. Belgium, 2012, §85). The ECtHR has underlined that all the above principles apply not only where the victim of the treatment contrary to Article 3 is the actual defendant but also where third parties are concerned (Othman (Abu Qatada) v. UK, 2012, §263-267, Ćwik v. Poland, 2020, §77 and §89, in the latter case, in particular, ill-treatment was inflicted on a third party by private individuals). - Ill-treatment and one’s right to silence (privilege against self-incrimination) The European Court has attached particular importance to one’s right to silence and the privilege against self-incrimination, considering them international standards which lie at the heart of the notion of a fair procedure under Article 6. They do not, however, extend to the use of material obtainable from the accused through the use of compulsory powers but which has an existence independent of the will of the suspect, such as documents acquired pursuant to a warrant, breath, blood, urine, hair or voice samples and bodily tissue for the purpose of DNA testing (Jalloh v. Germany [GC], 2006, §§100-102, Ibrahim and Others v. UK [GC], 2016, §§266-269). In order to determine whether one’s right to silence has been violated, three major factors have been examined by the European Court: the nature and degree of compulsion used to obtain the evidence; the weight of the public interest in the investigation and punishment of the offence in issue; the existence of any relevant safeguards in the procedure; and the use to which any material so obtained is put (Jalloh v. Germany [GC], 2006, §117) - Domestic courts’ obligation to examine allegations of ill-treatment casting doubt on the quality of evidence 16