Chapter v  Right to be Presumed Innocent and Privilege against Self-Incrimination 103 or where the will of the accused has been directly overborne in some way. The European Court said in Allan v the United Kingdom that the right: “…serves in principle to protect the freedom of a  suspected person to choose whether to speak or to remain silent when questioned by the police. Such freedom of choice is effectively undermined in a case in which, the suspect having elected to remain silent during questioning, the authorities use subterfuge to elicit, from the suspect, confessions or other statements of an incriminatory nature, which they were unable to obtain during such questioning and where the confessions or statements thereby obtained are adduced in evidence at trial.” 422 In Allan v the United Kingdom, this meant that the use as evidence of the accused’s admissions to an informer placed in the same police cell as the accused was treated as a violation of article 6 of the ECHR because those admissions were seen as the product of persistent questioning during the course of psychological pressure, thereby impinging upon the voluntariness of the statements. 5.2.6 Compulsion through use of torture or other forms of inhuman or degrading treatment Also relevant to the right to silence, especially the right not to be compelled to confess guilt, is the prohibition against torture or other forms of inhuman or degrading treatment (article 7 of the ICCPR and article 3 of the ECHR) and the right to be treated with humanity when detained (article 10(1) of the ICCPR). As explained by the Human Rights Committee in its general comment on fair trial rights: “To ill-treat persons against whom criminal charges are brought and to force them to make or sign, under duress, a confession admitting guilt violates both article 7 of the Covenant prohibiting torture and inhuman, cruel or degrading treatment and article 14, paragraph 3 (g) prohibiting compulsion to testify against oneself or confess guilt.” 423 Despite this, the Human Rights Committee has observed that methods that violate the prohibition against ill-treatment are frequently used. In Saldias de Lopez v Uruguay, for example, Lopez Burgos and several others were forced, under threats of death or serious injury, to sign false statements that were subsequently used in legal proceedings against them.424 422 Allan v the United Kingdom [2002] ECHR 702, para 50. 423 UN Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment 32 (2007), para 60. See, for example: Sultanova v Uzbekistan, HRC Communication 915/2000, UN Doc CCPR/C/86/D/915/2000 (2006), paras 7.2–7.3; Boimurodov v Tajikistan, HRC Communication 1042/2001, UN Doc CCPR/C/85/D/1042/2001 (2005), para 7.2; Shakurova v Tajikistan, HRC Communication 1044/2002, UN Doc CCPR/C/86/D/1044/2002 (2006), para 8.2; and Usaev v Russian Federation, HRC Communication 1577/2007, UN Doc CCPR/ C/99/D/1577/2007 (2010), para 9.3. 424 Saldias de Lopez v Uruguay, HRC Communication 52/1979, UN Doc CCPR/C/OP/1 at 88 (1984), para 13. See also: Izquierdo v Uruguay, HRC Communication 73/1981, UN Doc CCPR/C/15/D/73/1981 (1982), para 9; Kelly v Jamaica, HRC Communication 253/1987, UN Doc CCPR/C/41/D/253/1987 (1991), para 5.5; Deolall v Guyana, HRC Communication 912/2000, UN Doc CCPR/C/82/D/912/2000 (2004), para 5.1; Kurbonov