Chapter ii  Rights of Access to Justice and Equality in the Administration of Justice 43 access to courts is achieved by each country.135 In doing so, the European Court explains that the right of access to a court, by its very nature, calls for regulation by the State, which may vary in time and in place according to the needs and resources of the community and of individuals.136 States are, therefore, in principle, free to choose the means to be used towards this end.137 However, States’ discretion is guided by the following guiding principles, requiring that the regulation of access rights:138 • must not restrict the access left to the individual in such a way or to such an extent that the very essence of the right is impaired; • should pursue a legitimate aim; and • should be justified by reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be achieved. The right of access will be violated if persons are barred from bringing proceedings against any other persons on the basis of their race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.139 This aspect of the right to access by all persons is intimately linked to the principle of equality before court and tribunals (See also 2.2). Ato del Avellanal v Peru, for example, concerned a claim for unpaid rent brought by Mrs. Ato del Avellanal against former tenants of a property owned by her and her husband. Article 168 of the Peruvian Civil Code was found to violate the ICCPR because it provided that, when a woman is married, only the husband was entitled to bring a claim before the court in respect of matrimonial property.140 This part of the communication was dealt with as a violation of Articles 3 and 26 of the Covenant, relating to equality and non-discrimination. A statutory bar against bringing a civil claim was considered by the European Court of Human Rights in Philis v Greece. The applicant was an engineer who sought to bring a claim for reimbursement for work and wanted to bring the claim directly by him against the defendant company. Due to his membership in the Technical Chamber of Greece, however, he was statutorily barred from bringing the claim himself because only the Chamber could pursue such claims. The European Court held that Philis had the right to bring civil 135 Lithgow and Others v the United Kingdom [1986] ECHR 8, para 194 b); Ashingdane v the United Kingdom [1985] ECHR 8, para 57. 136 Lithgow and Others v the United Kingdom [1986] ECHR 8, para 194; Dunayev v Russia [2007] ECHR 404, para 34; Golder v the United Kingdom [1975] ECHR 1, paras 38; Ashingdane v the United Kingdom [1985] ECHR 8, para 57; Biondić v Croatia [2007] ECHR 910, para 24. 137 Kreuz v Poland [2001] ECHR 398, para 53. 138 Ashingdane v the United Kingdom [1985] ECHR 8, para 57; Lithgow and Others v the United Kingdom [1986] ECHR 8, para 194; Brualla Gómez de la Torre v Spain [1997] ECHR 104, para 33; Tinnelly & Sons Ltd and Others and McElduff and Others v the United Kingdom [1998] ECHR 56, para 72 and Steel and Morris v the United Kingdom [2005] ECHR 103, para 62; Aćimović v Croatia [2003] ECHR 481, para 29. 139 UN Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment 32 (2007), para 9; UN Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment 18 (1989), para 7; Kastelic v Croatia [2003] ECHR 348, paras 27–32. 140 Ato del Avellanal v Peru, HRC Communication 202/1986, UN Doc CCPR/C/34/D/202/1986 (1988), para 10.2.