author’s position sufficient to require a response from the State party. It argues that the facts relating to the complainant are not such as to warrant any response from Australia, and reiterates that the Committee noted that the risk of torture must be assessed on grounds that go beyond mere theory or suspicion. For the State party, there are no substantial grounds for believing that the complainant will be subjected to torture. 5.3 Notwithstanding the State party’s observations, the Committee considers that the complainant has provided sufficient information on the danger the complainant claims to run in the event of his return to Algeria to warrant consideration of his complaint on the merits. As the Committee sees no further obstacles to admissibility, it declares the complaint admissible and proceeds to the consideration of the merits. Consideration of the merits 6.1 The Committee must decide whether the forced return of the complainant to Algeria would violate the State party’s obligation, under article 3, paragraph 1, of the Convention, not to expel or return (refouler) an individual to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture. In order to reach its conclusion the Committee must take into account all relevant considerations, including the existence in the State concerned of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights. The aim, however, is to determine whether the individual concerned would personally risk torture in the country to which he or she would return. It follows that, in conformity with the Committee’s jurisprudence and despite the allegations of the complainant in regard to the situation in Algeria outlined in paragraph 3.4 above, the existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights in a country does not as such constitute sufficient grounds for determining whether the particular person would be in danger of being subjected to torture upon his return to that country; additional grounds must be adduced to show that the individual concerned would be personally at risk. Conversely, the absence of a consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights does not mean that a person cannot be considered to be in danger of being subjected to torture in his or her specific circumstances. 6.2 The Committee notes that the petitioner invokes protection under article 3 of the Convention on the ground that he is personally at danger of being arrested and tortured in connection with his and his relatives’ support for the FIS. His alleged connections with the FIS date back to 1992, when he was detained and interrogated for 45 minutes. It is not submitted that the complainant was tortured or prosecuted for his connections with the FIS before leaving for Saudi Arabia. The complainant has not satisfied the burden placed upon him to support his claim that there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture, and that Algeria is a country where a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights exist. 6.3 In the present case, the Committee also notes that the political activities of the complainant’s brother-in-law took place about 10 years ago, and that they may not in themselves constitute a risk for the complainant himself to be subjected to torture, should he be returned to Algeria. It further observes that the complainant’s alleged fear for military recall is not relevant to the issue under consideration. 137