CAT/C/45/D/333/2007 a remedy that must be exhausted to satisfy the requirement for exhaustion of domestic remedies, the question of an appeal against such a decision does not arise.5 6.4 The Committee also recalls its previous case law6 to the effect that the principle of exhaustion of domestic remedies requires petitioners to use remedies that are directly related to the risk of torture in the country to which they would be sent, not those that might allow them to remain where they are. 6.5 On the alleged violation of article 1, the Committee notes the State party’s submission that this aspect of the complaint is unfounded and incompatible with the provisions of the Convention. The Committee observes that the complainant does not substantiate his claim under article 1 and does not refute the State party’s arguments in this regard. Accordingly, the Committee finds that the complainant has failed to substantiate this part of the complaint for the purposes of admissibility, within the terms of article 22, paragraph 2 of the Convention. . 6.6 On the alleged violation of article 3, the Committee is of the opinion that the complainant’s arguments in relation to the general human rights situation in Uzbekistan, the allegations of discrimination against Tatars as well as his claims of past torture in Uzbekistan raise substantive issues, which should be dealt with on the merits and not on admissibility alone. Accordingly, the Committee finds this part of the communication admissible. Consideration of merits: 7.1 The Committee must determine whether the forced return of the complainant to Uzbekistan would violate the State party's obligations under article 3, paragraph 1, of the Convention not to expel or return ('refouler') an individual to another State, where there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to torture. 7.2 The Committee recalls its general comment on article 3 and its case-law, which state that the burden is generally on the complainant to present an arguable case and that the risk of torture must be assessed on grounds that go beyond mere theory or suspicion. While noting the general comment 1, it also recalls that the Committee has the power, provided by article 22, paragraph 4, of the Convention, of free assessment of the facts based upon the full set of circumstances in every case. 7.3 The Committee must evaluate whether there are substantial grounds for believing that the complainant would be personally in danger of being subjected to torture upon return to Uzbekistan. In assessing this risk, the Committee must take into account all relevant considerations, pursuant to article 3, paragraph 2, of the Convention, including the existence, in the State concerned, of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights. However, the Committee recalls that the aim of its determination is to establish whether the individual concerned would be personally at risk of being subjected to torture in the country to which he or she would return. It follows that the existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights in a country does not as such constitute a sufficient ground for determining that a particular person would be in danger of being subjected to torture upon his or her return to that country7. Additional grounds must be adduced to show that the individual concerned would be personally at risk. Conversely, the absence of a consistent pattern of gross violations of 5 Falcon Ríos v. Canada , No. 133/1999, at para. 7.3. Anup Roy v. Sweden, decision of 23 November 2001, No. 170/2000, para. 7.1. 7 S.P.A. v. Canada, 282/2005 6 7