ESSEX PAPER 3: INITIAL GUIDANCE ON THE INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UN NELSON MANDELA RULES Authority of inspectors/monitors The Essex group discussed the new provision on the authority of inspectors in Rule 84(1), which is applicable to both internal inspectors as well as external monitors: •  Access all information, including on the number of prisoners, places and locations of detention; •  Access all information on the treatment of prisoners, their records and conditions of detention;135 •  Freely choose which prisons to visit, including unannounced visits at their own initiative;136 •  Freely choose which prisoners to interview; •  Conduct private and fully confidential interviews with prisoners; •  Conduct private and fully confidential interviews with prison staff; and •  Make recommendations to the prison administration and other competent authorities. The Essex group stressed the requirement for inspectors to access ‘all places and locations of detention’, which includes all areas of prison facilities, including maximum security wings.137 Note was made of the prison administration’s obligation to enable and facilitate the work of inspectors and monitors. At the same time, the experts noted frequent problems of members of monitoring bodies when seeking confidential interviews with prisoners. While the protection of monitors from dangerous prisoners is legitimate and required, it must not become an obstacle to the very function of inspection and external monitoring. In particular, it must not prevent confidential interviews of monitors with prisoners in a trustful atmosphere. Such an environment is lacking, for example, if the prisoner being interviewed is handcuffed to bars or windows during the conversation. The participants clarified that interviews referred to in Rule 84(c) require the consent of the interviewee and that both prisoners and prison staff who speak to inspectors and monitors need to be protected from any risk of intimidation, retaliation or other negative consequence as a result of having been interviewed. The Essex group recommended to expand safeguards against such risks developed under Rule 57(2) on inspectors and monitors, where applicable.138 The SPT has been critical of detention authorities limiting the access of monitoring bodies for reasons of confidentiality (e.g. Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Report on the visit of the Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment for the purpose of providing advisory assistance to the national preventive mechanism of the Republic of Malta: Report to the State Party, 1 February 2016, CAT/OP/MLT/1, para. 33 (SPT Report on visit to Malta). 135  The Special Rapporteur on Torture, for example, has stressed the criterion of unimpeded access (on a regular and an ad hoc basis) without prior notice (Special Rapporteur on Torture report 2013, A/68/295, para. 82). See also CAT SMR revision observations, CAT/C/51/4, para. 58. 136  Unimpeded access to all places of detention, all areas and facilities within them and all prisoners is established good practice and proven precondition for the effectiveness of an inspection/ monitoring mechanism. See in particular Article 14 (1) of OPCAT and Principle XXIV of the Principles and Best Practices on the Protection of Persons Deprived of Liberty in the Americas. 137  The Essex group noted as good practice Articles 15 and 21 of the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture, according to which ‘No authority or official shall order, apply, permit or tolerate any sanction against any person’ for having communicated information to the monitoring body. 138  Penal Reform International and the Essex Human Rights Centre | 40