OSCE/ODIHR Opinion on the Draft Federal Law on the Support to the National Human Rights Institution of Switzerland its priorities and activities, and to allocate funding according to these priorities. Thus, it is recommended to include in the Draft Act specific provisions regarding the NHRI’s budget and financial autonomy. Such provisions should prescribe that the budgetary allocation of funds shall be adequate to ensure the full, independent and effective discharge of the responsibilities and functions of the institution.132 The Draft Act should be supplemented in that respect and should also specifically provide that the NHRI shall manage the budgetary allocation at its disposal in an autonomous manner.133 86. Under General Observation 1.10, several elements need to be taken into account to define what constitutes “adequate funding” when drawing up the annual budget for the NHRI. In addition to an appropriate level of salaries and benefits for members of the leadership body and staff (see pars 72-73 and 81 supra), these should include the allocation of funds for the NHRI’s own premises, which should be sufficient to ensure that said premises are accessible to the wider community, including to persons with disabilities, and to allow for the establishment of well-functioning communications systems, including telephone and the Internet.134 Article 2 par 2 specifies that the universities and higher education institutions shall make available “the necessary infrastructure, including premises and computer equipment, to the NHRI free of charge”. This means that the NHRI will not have its own premises and that it will in essence be dependent on the decisions of universities and/or higher education institutions in that respect. 87. In principle, national law should also indicate the relevant budget source.135 When deciding on the accreditation of NHRIs, the Sub-Committee on Accreditation reviews whether the underlying legislation provides that an NHRI’s funding is allocated to a separate budget line dedicated only to the NHRI.136 This should be included in the Draft Act. The Sub-Committee on Accreditation has stated that situations where the NHRI’s budget is subject to government approval or where the executive has substantial control over budgetary decisions, as is the case here, raise concerns with respect to the NHRI’s financial independence.137 To sustain the institution’s independence, these considerations should be taken into account by the legal drafters. 88. Additionally, to further increase the NHRI’s financial independence, some additional safeguards may also be contemplated. For instance, the Draft Act may specify that the funds allocated may not be reduced in a manner that interferes with the NHRI’s independence.138 The relevant legislation could also prescribe that the NHRI itself should submit its budget proposal to the relevant authority and that this proposal should in principle likewise not be reduced.139 In addition, legal provisions against unwarranted budgetary cutbacks could be introduced, 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 See e.g., Venice Commission, Opinion on the possible reform of the Ombudsman Institution in Kazakhstan, adopted by the Venice Commission at its 71st Plenary Session (Venice, 1-2 June 2007), CDL-AD(2007)020, pars 8 and 30.VI, <http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD(2007)020-e>. See e.g., op. cit. footnote 107, pars 74-75 (2015 Venice Commission’s Opinion on the Law on the People's Advocate of Moldova). Op. cit. footnote 9, General Observation 1.10. ibid. Justification to General Observation 1.10. See e.g., op. cit. footnote 60, pages 19 and 26 on the accreditation of NHRIs of Montenegro and Canada (SCA Report and Recommendations of May 2016). See e.g., Sub-Committee on Accreditation, Report and Recommendations of the Session (November 2015), page 12, <http://nhri.ohchr.org/EN/AboutUs/ICCAccreditation/Documents/SCA%20FINAL%20REPORT%20-%20NOVEMBER%202015English.pdf>. See e.g., op. cit. footnote 107, pars 74-75 (2015 Venice Commission’s Opinion on the Law on the People's Advocate of Moldova). See e.g., op. cit. footnote 132, pars 8 and 30.VI (2007 Venice Commission’s Opinion on the Possible Reform of the Ombudsman Institution in Kazakhstan). 28