CCPR/C/120/D/2470/2014 Annex Joint opinion of Committee members Yuval Shany, Christof Heyns and Photini Pazartzis (dissenting) 1. We regret that we are unable to join the majority on the Committee in finding that, in deciding to deport the author and her son to Italy, Denmark would, if it implemented the decision, violate its obligations under article 7 of the Covenant. 2. In paragraph 9.3 of the Views, the Committee recalls that: “it is generally for the organs of the States parties to the Covenant to review and evaluate facts and evidence in order to determine whether such a risk exists, unless it is found that the evaluation was clearly arbitrary or amounted to a denial of justice”. Despite this, the majority of the Committee rejected the factual conclusion of the Immigration Service and the Board that the author had failed to establish grounds for asylum because she would be protected in Italy against refoulement, and because “the financial and social conditions offered to her would be adequate for Italy to serve as her first country of asylum” (para. 2.9 above). The majority considered that the State party failed to “fully examine the author’s claims, based on her personal circumstances, that despite being granted residence in Italy, she would face unbearable living conditions there” (para. 9.9). 3. We disagree with the analysis offered by the majority, as it has not been shown to us that any of the facts alleged by the author was not taken into account by the Danish authorities. Furthermore, the conclusion reached by the Danish authorities represents, in our view, a reasonable application of the legal standards introduced by the Covenant. 4. According to the well-established case law of the Committee, States parties are obliged not to deport persons from their territory when there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of irreparable harm, such as that contemplated by articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant, either in the country to which removal is to be effected or in any country to which the person may subsequently be removed.1 Not every exposure to personal hardship in a country of removal would, however, fall within the scope of the removing State’s obligations as regards non-refoulement.2 5. With the possible exceptions of those individuals who face special hardship due to their particular situation of vulnerability, 3 which renders their plight exceptionally harsh and irreparable in nature, poor living conditions and difficulties in accessing the social services available do not constitute in themselves grounds for non-refoulement. A contrary interpretation, recognizing all individuals facing poverty and limited social assistance as potential victims of article 7 of the Covenant, has little support in the case law of the Committee or in State practice, and would extend the protection of article 7 and the nonrefoulement principle (which are absolute in nature) to breaking point. 6. Although we support the Views adopted by the Committee in Jasin v. Denmark,4 the facts in that case were significantly different from the facts of the present case and do not warrant the same legal conclusion. In Jasin v. Denmark, the author was in a particularly vulnerable situation, which made it nearly impossible for her to confront the exceptional hardships expected were she to be deported to Italy: a single mother of three small children, having to contend with her own health problems, who had lost her immigration status in Italy and whom the Italian welfare system had demonstrably failed to assist. Under these exceptional circumstances, the Committee was of the view that, without specific assurances of social assistance, Italy could not be considered a “safe country” of removal for the author 1 2 3 4 12 See the Committee’s general comment No. 31 (2004) on the nature of the general legal obligation imposed on States parties to the Covenant, para. 12. See communication No. 265/1987, Vuolanne v. Finland, Views adopted on 7 April 1989. See communication No. 2360/2014, Jasin v. Denmark, Views adopted on 22 July 2015. Ibid.