Council of State on 21 June 1996 (Prefect of Yvelines v. SARR, No. 168785 and Lakkis, No. 16053) was the right of a "reapplicant" for asylum to reside in France recognized in certain cases, and then only for a short while, since the decree of 14 March 1997 expressly banned any fresh application in the absence of permission from a prefect to reside in France. It is scarcely realistic, therefore, to suggest that the author ought to have submitted a third application, and no one with professional experience of the law on aliens would have considered doing so. What is more, until 14 March 1997, which was the date on which the decree took effect, the author was still legally banned from French territory for three years by the decision handed down by the Paris Correctional Court on 14 March 1994, and could not by definition be granted permission to reside in France 6 and thus to submit an application for asylum, which necessarily supposed previous authorization to reside in France. 5.7 The State party wrongly suggests that, after 14 March 1997, the author could have approached OFPRA even without being authorized to reside in France. Under French law, OFPRA cannot be approached directly; it only considers applications for asylum forwarded by a prefecture which has granted the asylum-seeker permission to reside in France. 5.8 As regards the assignment to a fixed place of residence (which confers no right to work, welfare coverage, etc.), counsel argues that this is a discretionary measure which the administration may take but which cannot be requested from an independent authority or court: it cannot therefore be regarded as a "judicial remedy" within the meaning of international law. As the State party indicates, the administration may take such a step if it considers it has been shown that the individual concerned cannot return to his country of origin in view, inter alia, of the risks to which he is exposed. It will be recalled that, for seven years, the administration has taken the view, when the question of asylum, residence or expulsion has arisen, that returning to his country of origin will not cause the author any problem. It is hard to see how things would be any different if the question of assignment to a fixed place of residence arose. 5.9 The appeal against the refusal of permission to reside in France currently pending before the Limoges Administrative Court does not entail a stay of execution and thus affords the author no protection whatsoever against forcible return to his home country. In parallel with his request to have that refusal overturned, the author submitted, in February 1999, an application for suspension of the contested decision. That procedure, too, does not entail a stay of execution. While, theoretically, it should be pursued as a matter of extreme urgency,g one need only observe that the application has still not been heard and that delays in such cases can run into years. As for the appeal, counsel states that, in 1999, petitions submitted in 1994 were coming up before the Limoges Administrative Court for a hearing. 5.10 As for the substance, the appeals lodged, even if they entailed a stay of execution and even if they were heard within a reasonable period, would, in keeping with constant case law, be rejected. Applications for suspension are consistently held to be inadmissible unless the contested decision places the petitioner, already in an irregular situation, in a new de facto and de jure situation. With regard to the substance, moreover, there is first of all case law that is just as constant that fears in the country of origin are of no avail against a refusal of permission to reside in France. Secondly, the applicant always bears the burden of providing conclusively the truth of the facts he cites; yet by definition, no absolute proof such as the French administration and courts demand can be provided in the present case. C. The author is not a victim in the absence of expulsion proceedings 5.11 According to counsel, keeping the author in a situation where he has no right to any legal support, housing, or welfare coverage is in itself suffering intentionally inflicted and/or condoned with the objective of g Administrative Courts and Administrative Appeals Courts Code, article R 120. 172