CRC/C/85/D/56/2018 to be transferred to Italy was the fact that she did not know anyone there. The State party argues that if E.A. and U.A. were to consider that Italy was violating its obligation to provide them with assistance, it would be for them to assert their rights directly with the Italian authorities. 4.14 With regard to article 6 (2) of the Convention, the State party emphasizes that this provision is formulated in very broad terms and is of an eminently programmatic nature. The State party considers that the author’s claims in relation to the attempted transfer to Italy are manifestly ill-founded. In the alternative, insofar as the author has not provided any additional evidence that would support a violation of article 6 (2) of the Convention, she cannot claim such a violation. 4.15 With regard to the alleged violation of article 12 of the Convention, the State party cites the jurisprudence of the Federal Administrative Court, according to which this provision does not confer on children the unconditional right to be heard orally and in person in any judicial or administrative proceedings affecting them. It merely ensures that the children can make their views known in an appropriate manner, for example in a written statement by their representative. Only if the child has the discernment, i.e. the ability and maturity to understand the meaning and purpose of the asylum procedure and to explain the reasons they risk persecution, should he or she be given the opportunity to express his or her opinion at a hearing in accordance with the Asylum Act (No. 142.31) of 26 June 1998. According to the practice of the State Secretariat for Migration, children’s capacity for discernment can be presumed from the age of 14. E.A. and U.A. were only 8 and 3 years old at the time of the State Secretariat’s decision. Furthermore, they are included in their mother’s refugee application because they are minors. Given their very young age, it was not necessary to hear the children orally and grant them the right to be heard separately in writing. Moreover, the author does not specify the facts or elements that E.A. and U.A. could have put forward in the event that the State Secretariat had granted them a right to be heard as she understands it. There is therefore every indication that the author and her lawyer were able to ensure that the children’s right to be heard under article 12 of the Convention could be exercised. It follows that the allegation of a violation of article 12 of the Convention is manifestly ill-founded or, in the alternative, that there has been no violation of that provision. 4.16 According to the State party, article 22 of the Convention imposes obligations of a programmatic nature. The author’s allegations of a violation of this article are manifestly unfounded for the same reasons as her allegations of a violation of article 3. In the alternative, the State party notes that the author’s fears that she would not receive the necessary protection and assistance in Italy are based on hypothetical considerations. She alleges in general terms that removal to Italy would violate article 22 of the Convention, but this does not suffice to establish a violation of that article. 4.17 As for article 24 of the Convention, according to the Federal Council, this provision contains “instructions for programmes to promote children’s health”. With regard to the author’s allegation that removal to Italy would prevent adequate psychological treatment following the degrading treatment the children allegedly suffered during the attempted removal, the State party reiterates its observations regarding the non-exhaustion of domestic remedies and the manifestly ill-founded nature of the author’s allegations in relation to the attempted removal. In the alternative, the State party concludes that there has been no violation of this article. 4.18 With regard to the alleged violation of article 37 of the Convention, the State party refers to its observations on the ill-founded nature of the communication. In the alternative, it concludes that there has been no violation of this article. Author’s comments on the State party’s observations 5.1 In her comments of 28 August 2019, the author submits that she has exhausted all available domestic remedies. The Federal Administrative Court was the highest court before which she could challenge the State Secretariat for Migration’s decision of 20 July 2018. In her appeal to the Court of 31 July 2018, the author noted the non-application of the sovereignty clause of the Dublin III Regulation in the interest of the very vulnerable family GE.20-14363 9