CAT/C/37/D/262/2005 Page 5 4.2 The State party concludes that the complainant’s letter cannot be considered as a communication within the meaning of article 22 of the Convention. In the event that it was nevertheless considered as such, it invites the Committee to declare it inadmissible for failing to disclose violations of the Convention, or as amounting to an abuse of the right of submission, or as being manifestly unfounded under Rule 107, paragraph b, of the rules of procedure. Complainant’s comments on the State party’s submission 5. By letter of 12 March 2005, the complainant presents her comments on the State party’s submission on the admissibility of the communication. She provides more detail on the sequence of events leading to her departure from Belarus. She also sends a medical report dated 4 July 2002 of the 7th urban polyclinic in Minsk. The report states that the complainant has suffered a trauma and damage to her sexual organs. State party’s submissions on the merits of the communication 6.1 By note verbale of 24 June 2005, the State party reaffirms its challenge to the admissibility of the communication; subsidiarily, it submits the following arguments on the merits. The State party first recalls its obligations under article 3 of the Convention, and recalls that the Committee has specified the conditions of application of this provision in its jurisprudence and in its General Comment No.1 of 21 November 1997. 6.2 Under article 3, paragraph 2, of the Convention, the Committee must take into account all relevant considerations including the existence in the State concerned of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights. The State party submits that it must be determined whether the individual concerned would be personally at risk of being subjected to torture in the country to which he or she would return. It follows that the existence of a consistent pattern of human rights violations in a country does not as such constitute a sufficient ground for determining that a particular person would be in danger of being subjected to torture upon his return to that country.1 Consequently, additional grounds must be adduced to show that the risk of torture can be qualified as “foreseeable, real and personal���.2 The State party notes that the situation in Belarus cannot of itself constitute a sufficient ground for concluding that the complainant would be in danger of being subjected to torture upon her return to that country.3 The State party contends that the complainant has not demonstrated that she would face a “foreseeable, real and personal” risk of being subjected to torture upon her return to Belarus. 6.3 Under General Comment No.1, whether the complainant has been tortured or ill-treated in the past must be taken into account so as to assess the risk of being subjected to torture upon return to her country. The complainant claims that she was raped several times in 2002, the first time by three police officers as part of an interrogation as to the whereabouts of her 1 See Communication No. 94/1997, K.N. v. Switzerland, decision adopted on 19 May 1998, para.10.2. 2 Ibid, para.10.5. See also Communication No. 100/1997, J.U.A. v. Switzerland, decision adopted on 10 November 1998, paras.6.3 and 6.5. 3 See also Communication No. 106/1998, N.P. v. Australia, decision adopted on 6 May 1999, para.6.5.