whether the action of the State in rejecting the application of a new immigrant for nationality is reasonable or not. Secondly, I fail to see what is the difference between the two situations: one, where an application for nationality is made and is unreasonably refused and the other, where an application for nationality is not made at all. In both cases, the new immigrant would continue to be a non-national and if in one case, special ties or intimate connection or link with the country of immigration would render such country “his own country”, there is no logical or relevant reason why it should not have the same consequence or effect in the other case. as his own country. I am therefore inclined to take the view, on the facts as set out in the communication, that Canada was the author's own country within the meaning of article 12, paragraph 4, and he could not be arbitrarily expelled or deported from Canada by the Government of Canada. That leaves the question whether the expulsion or deportation of the author could be said to be arbitrary. On this question, I recall the Committee's jurisprudence that the concept of arbitrariness must not be confined to procedural arbitrariness but must include substantive arbitrariness as well and it must not be equated with “against the law” but must be interpreted broadly to include such elements as inappropriateness or excessiveness or disproportionateness. Where an action taken by the State party against a person is excessive or disproportionate to the harm sought to be prevented, it would be unreasonable and arbitrary. Here, in the present case, the author is sought to be expelled on account of his recidivist tendency. He has committed around 40 offences including theft and robbery for which he has been punished. The question is whether it is necessary, in all the circumstances of the case, to expel or deport him in order to protect the society from his criminal propensity or whether this object can be achieved by taking a lesser action than expulsion or deportation. The element of proportionality must be taken into account. I think that if this test is applied, the action of Canada in seeking to expel or deport the author would appear to be arbitrary, particularly in the light of the fact that the author has succeeded in controlling alcohol abuse and no offence appears to have been committed by him since May 1991. If the author commits any more offences, he can be adequately punished and imprisoned and if, having regard to his past criminal record, a sufficiently heavy sentence of imprisonment is passed against him, it would act as a deterrent against any further criminal activity on his part and in any event, he would be put out of action during the time that he is in prison. This is the kind of action which would be taken against a national in order to protect the society and qua a national, it would be regarded as adequate. I do not see why it should not be regarded as adequate qua a person who is not a national but who has adopted Canada as his own country or come to regard Canada as his own country. I am of the view that the action of expulsion or deportation of the author from Canada resulting in completely uprooting him from his home, family and moorings, would be excessive and disproportionate to the harm sought to be prevented and hence must be regarded as arbitrary. I fail to understand what is the basis on which the majority states that countries like Canada have a right to expect that immigrants within due course acquire all the rights and assume all the obligations that nationality entails. I agree that individuals who do not take advantage of the opportunity to apply for nationality, must bear the consequences of not being nationals. But the question is: what are these consequences? Do they entail exclusion from the benefit of article 12, paragraph 4? That is the question which has to be answered and it cannot be assumed, as the majority seems to have done, that the consequence is exclusion from the benefit of article 12, paragraph 4. Throughout the decision of the Committee, I find that the majority starts with the predetermination that in the case of the author, Canada cannot be regarded as “his own country” even though he has special ties and most intimate connection and link with Canada and he has always regarded Canada as his own country, and then tries to justify this conclusion by holding that there were no unreasonable impediments in the way of the author acquiring Canadian nationality but the author did not take advantage of the opportunity to apply for Canadian nationality and must therefore bear the consequence of Canada not being regarded as his own country and therefore of being deprived of the benefit of article 12, paragraph 4. If I may repeat, the fact that the author did not apply for Canadian nationality in a situation where there were no unreasonable impediments in such acquisition, cannot have any bearing on the question whether Canada could or could not be regarded as “his own country”. It is because the author is not a Canadian national that the question has arisen and it is begging the question to say that Canada could not be regarded as “his own country” because he did not or could not acquire Canadian nationality. It is undoubtedly true that on this view, both U.K. and Canada would be “his own country” for the author. One would be the country of nationality while the other would be, what I may call, the country of adoption. It is quite conceivable that an individual may have two countries which he can call his own: one may be a country of his nationality and the other, a country adopted by him I would therefore hold that in the present case, there is a violation of article 12, paragraph 4, of the Covenant. On this view, it becomes unnecessary to consider whether there is also a violation of articles 17 and 23 of the Covenant. 62