Advance unedited version CCPR/C/133/D/2510/2014 7.2 The Committee notes the author’s claim that returning him to the Islamic Republic of Iran would expose him to a risk of irreparable harm, in violation of article 7 of the Covenant, because he would face persecution by the Iranian authorities for having abandoned the Basij — an Iranian militia — and having fled the Islamic Republic of Iran illegally. The Committee also takes note of the author’s statement regarding his conversion from Islam to Christianity, including his interest in Christianity allegedly manifested with his very distinct tattoo on his arm, and the alleged risk of persecution that he may face from the authorities if they discover his tattoo, should he be returned to the Islamic Republic of Iran. 7.3 The Committee recalls its General Comment no. 31 (2004) on the nature of the general legal obligation imposed on States parties to the Covenant, in which it refers to the obligation of States parties not to extradite, deport, expel or otherwise remove a person from their territory when there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of irreparable harm such as that contemplated by articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant (para. 12). The Committee has also indicated that the risk must be personal 27 and that there is a high threshold for providing substantial grounds to establish that a real risk of irreparable harm exists. 28 Thus, all relevant facts and circumstances must be considered, including the general human rights situation in the author’s country of origin.29 The Committee recalls that it is generally for the organs of States parties to examine the facts and evidence of the case in question in order to determine whether such a risk exists, 30 unless it can be established that the assessment was clearly arbitrary or amounted to a manifest error or denial of justice. 31 7.4 The Committee notes the finding of the Danish Refugee Appeals Board that the author failed to substantiate his claim that he would be at risk of persecution or abuse by the Iranian authorities as a result of his former membership with the Basij militia, of his conversion from the Muslim faith to Christianity, of his tattoos and of the fact that he does not hold a valid Iranian passport. The Committee also notes that the Refugee Appeals Board members found that the author had failed to substantiate his claim that his conversion was genuine, despite the existence of a certificate of baptism, a pastor’s declaration and letters of support from the Bethania Church. In that connection, the Committee observes the inconsistencies found by the Board in the author’s statements and the fact that the author converted only after refusal of his asylum application and of his request for reopening his case, as well as following his strong resistance and opposition to his removal from Denmark. The Committee further notes that when informed on two occasions about new grounds for asylum – based on the author’s conversion, on getting more tattoos in Denmark, on having his name and photo published in several newspaper articles, on having featured in a radio broadcast, and on having informed the Iranian Embassy that he had converted – the Refugee Appeals Board decided to reopen his case on both occasions and conduct new oral hearings, which allowed the author to have these new grounds assessed by the Board, and that the issues were analysed in detail in the decisions adopted. 7.5 In that regard, the Committee considers that when an asylum seeker submits that he or she has converted to another religion after his or her initial asylum request has been dismissed in the country of asylum, it may be reasonable for the States parties to conduct an in-depth examination 27 28 29 30 31 K. v. Denmark (CCPR/C/114/D/2393/2014), para. 7.3; P.T. v. Denmark (CCPR/C/113/D/2272/2013), para. 7.2; and X v. Denmark, para. 9.2. X v. Sweden (CCPR/C/103/D/1833/2008), para. 5.18. Ibid. Also X v. Denmark, para. 9.2. Pillai et al. v. Canada (CCPR/C/101/D/1763/2008), para. 11.4; and Lin v. Australia (CCPR/C/107/D/1957/2010), para. 9.3. See, for example, K. v. Denmark, para. 7.4. 11