CCPR/C/123/D/2348/2014 author alleges that she was denied access to health care necessary for the protection of her life and long-term health, not that she is under threat of such denial. The author submits, however, that her allegation is analogous to the elements of the communication in Dranichnikov v. Australia, which the Committee found to be admissible. Although in Dranichnikov the author was no longer subject to the procedures before the refugee tribunal and her family had been granted a permanent protection visa, the author had been subject to those procedures in the past and the allegation with respect to tribunal procedures was found to be admissible. In the present case, the author notes that, similarly, the allegation that her rights under the Covenant were violated in the past is not rendered moot by the fact that changes in her circumstances mean that the impugned policy is no longer applicable to her. 9.4 With regard to the State party’s comments on the case A.P.L.-v.d.M. v. Netherlands, the author recalls that the Committee’s decision relied on the particular fact of the case, in which an impugned restriction on benefits had been abolished, with retroactive effect. In the present case, the author notes that the exclusion of undocumented migrants from access to health care has not been abolished and the violation of her rights under the Covenant has not been remedied. 9.5 The author also rejects the State party’s observation that her submission amounts to an actio popularis. The author recalls that the Committee held, in the case Jazairi v. Canada, that an “individual must be personally and directly affected by the violations claimed” and that the allegations with respect to the “scheme as a whole” reached “beyond the circumstances of the author’s own case”.28 In the present case, the author maintains that she challenges her exclusion from IFHP, which personally and directly affects her. The author also submits that the discretion provided to the Minister of Health to grant access to the Program for individuals without lawful status in Canada was not in effect at the time she was denied. The author further submits that the State party has not indicated that the discretion is exercised according to any criterion related to the protection of life and longterm health. Furthermore, the author notes that the two cases in which discretion has been granted suggest that rare exceptions have been made based on particular immigration circumstances rather than on the basis of the need for health care under article 6 of the Covenant. 9.6 The author further rejects the State party’s observation that her submission is not compatible with articles 6, 7 and 9 of the Covenant. The author maintains that she does not argue that the Covenant includes “a right to publicly funded and primary health care” but alleges a deprivation of her right to life which, in her circumstances, required access to a programme that provided coverage of emergency and essential health care. The author thus submits that the main question regarding the State party’s compliance with article 6 which the State party does not address is the finding of the domestic courts that a violation of the right to life is not arbitrary because it was justified as a measure to promote compliance with immigration law. 9.7 As to the State party’s comments on the alleged violation of article 26, the author notes that in the case Danning v. Netherlands,29 the differentiation at issue was with respect to differential insurance rates for married and unmarried individuals, which the Committee found to be based on reasonable and objective criteria. The author finds that such distinction is not analogous to a refusal of emergency and essential health care on the basis of immigration status, both because the right to life and personal security are at stake and because the ground of the distinction at issue in the present case is recognized as a basis for widespread discrimination and stigmatization in many countries. Although the State party, relying on the case Oulajin and Kaiss v. Netherlands, argues that such a differentiation is not intended to stigmatize, the author submits that the distinction at issue in that case, 28 29 See Jazairi v. Canada, para. 7.6. See communication No. 180/1984, Danning v. Netherlands (CCPR/C/29/D/180/1984), paras. 12.4– 12.5. 11