CCPR/C/123/D/2348/2014 its jurisprudence according to which the right to health, as such, is not protected by the provisions of the Covenant.36 However, the author has explained that she does not claim a violation of the right to health but of her right to life, arguing that the State party failed to fulfil its positive obligation to protect her right to life which, in her particular circumstances, required provision of emergency and essential health care (see para. 9.7) Accordingly, the Committee declares the claims under article 6 admissible. 10.10 The Committee takes note of the claims of the author under articles 7 and 9 (1) and considers that the author did not provide sufficient information to explain how the denial of access to health care could have exposed her to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or could have undermined her enjoyment of rights under article 9 (1) of the Covenant. Consequently, the Committee considers that these claims have not been sufficiently substantiated and are therefore inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional Protocol. 10.11 Concerning the author’s claims under article 26, the Committee notes that the State party has not contested the admissibility of these claims, arguing instead that the Government justified its decision to deny health-care coverage to undocumented migrants on the basis of the desire to encourage compliance with federal immigration laws. The Committee notes that the Federal Government has not denied that it could have provided the author with necessary health care by permitting her, as an undocumented migrant with a need for urgent medical assistance, to receive coverage for essential health care under IFHP. Consequently, the part of the complaint referring to article 26 is declared admissible in accordance with article 2 of the Optional Protocol. 10.12 Recalling its jurisprudence according to which the provisions of article 2 lay down general obligations for States parties and cannot, by themselves, give rise to a separate claim under the Optional Protocol as they can be invoked only in conjunction with other substantive articles of the Covenant,37 the Committee considers the author’s claims under article 2 (1) and (3) (a) to be inadmissible under article 3 of the Optional Protocol. 10.13 Accordingly, the Committee declares the author’s claims under articles 6 and 26 to be admissible and proceeds with its consideration of the merits. Consideration of the merits 11.1 The Committee has considered the communication in the light of all the information submitted to it by the parties, in accordance with article 5 (1) of the Optional Protocol. 11.2 Concerning the alleged violation of article 6, the Committee takes note of the author’s claims that (a) the denial of her access to health care put her life and health at risk, as she could not receive medical treatment corresponding to the seriousness of her health problems; (b) her already critical health status deteriorated to life-threatening status in 2009; and (c) the Federal Court and the Federal Court of Appeal agreed that her life and health had been put at significant risk by the State party’s denial of access to health-care coverage under IFHP. In that context, the Committee notes that the author resided in Canada for a period of time, worked there from 1999 to 2008 and sought to regularize her status in 2005. 11.3 The Committee recalls that in its general comment No. 6, it noted that the right to life had been too often narrowly interpreted and that it could not properly be understood in a restrictive manner, and that the protection of the right required that States adopt positive measures. The Committee considers that the right to life concerns the entitlement of individuals to be free from acts and omissions that are intended or may be expected to cause their unnatural or premature death, as well as to enjoy a life with dignity. Furthermore, the obligation of States parties to respect and ensure the right to life extends to reasonably foreseeable threats and life-threatening situations that can result in loss of life. States parties may be in violation of article 6 even if such threats and situations do not 36 37 14 See Linder v. Finland, para. 4.3. See, e.g., communications No. 2343/2014, H.E.A.K. v. Denmark (CCPR/C/114/D/2343/2014), para. 7.4; No. 2202/2012, Castañeda v. Mexico (CCPR/C/108/D/2202/2012), para. 6.8; No. 2195/2012, Ch.H.O. v. Canada (CCPR/C/118/D/2195/2012), para. 9.4; No. 1887/2009, Peirano Basso v. Uruguay (CCPR/C/99/D/1887/2009), para. 9.4; and No. 1834/2008, A.P. v. Ukraine (CCPR/C/105/D/1834/2008), para. 8.5.