CAT/C/63/D/717/2015 State party does not contest the complainants’ detailed arguments concerning the lack of effectiveness of the second asylum application in the particular circumstances of their case. 8.4 Furthermore, the Committee considers that the complainants’ claims before the Committee are based on a set of facts which were examined by the State party’s authorities and which have been sufficiently substantiated for the purposes of admissibility. The Committee notes in this respect that the State party does not challenge the admissibility of the complaint on any other grounds, and it therefore finds no obstacles to the admissibility. 8.5 Accordingly, the Committee declares the complaint admissible with regard to the facts and claims brought before the State party’s authorities and proceeds with its consideration of the merits. Consideration of the merits 9.1 The Committee has considered the communication in the light of all the information made available to it by the parties, in accordance with article 22 (4) of the Convention. 9.2 In the present case, the issue before the Committee is whether the return of the complainants to the Russian Federation would constitute a violation of the State party’s obligation under article 3 (1) of the Convention not to expel or to return (“refouler”) a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to torture. 9.3 The Committee must evaluate whether there are substantial grounds for believing that the complainants would be personally in danger of being subjected to torture upon return to the Russian Federation. In assessing that risk, the Committee must take into account all relevant considerations, pursuant to article 3 (2) of the Convention, including the existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights. However, the Committee recalls that the aim of such determination is to establish whether the individual concerned would be personally at a foreseeable and real risk of being subjected to torture in the country to which he or she would be returned. It follows that the existence of a pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights in a country does not as such constitute sufficient reason for determining that a particular person would be in danger of being subjected to torture on return to that country; additional grounds must be adduced to show that the individual concerned would be personally at risk. Conversely, the absence of a consistent pattern of flagrant violations of human rights does not mean that a person might not be subjected to torture in his or her specific circumstances.37 9.4 The Committee recalls its general comment No. 4 (2017) on the implementation of article 3 in the context of article 22, according to which the non-refoulement obligation exists whenever there are “substantial grounds” for believing that the person concerned would be in danger of being subjected to torture in a State to which he or she is facing deportation, either as an individual or a member of a group which may be at risk of being tortured in the State of destination. The Committee’s practice in this context has been to determine that “substantial grounds” exist whenever the risk of torture is “foreseeable, personal, present and real”.38 Indications of personal risk may include, but are not limited to: the complainant’s ethnic background; previous torture; incommunicado detention or other form of arbitrary and illegal detention in the country of origin; clandestine escape from the country of origin for threats of torture; and violence against women, including rape. 39 9.5 The Committee also recalls that the burden of proof is on the author of the complaint, who must present an arguable case — that is, must submit circumstantiated arguments showing that the danger of being subjected to torture is foreseeable, present, personal and real. However, when the complainant is in a situation where he or she cannot elaborate on his or her case, for instance when the complainant has demonstrated that he or she has no possibility of obtaining documentation relating to his or her allegation of torture or is deprived of his or her liberty, the burden of proof is reversed and it is up to the State party 37 38 39 12 See T.M. v. Republic of Korea (CAT/C/53/D/519/2012), para. 9.3. See the Committee’s general comment No. 4 (2017) on the implementation of article 3 in the context of article 22, para. 11. Ibid., para. 45.