CCPR/C/112/D/2018/2010 police personnel may be disciplined. No individual criminal liability is established on that list for, among other acts, human rights violations and extrajudicial killings. 7 Furthermore, even when the Supreme Court has instructed the police to file a First Information Report against such individuals, little or no action has been taken by the police. 2.21 The author adds that the Army Act (1959) also provides immunity against prosecution to all members of its forces when the acts in question took place while discharging duties. Section 24 A indicates that “in case any person dies or suffers any loss as a result of any action taken by any person to whom this act is applicable while discharging his duties, no case may be filed in any court against him”. The Army Act does include a provision requiring investigations and courts martial for breaches of the Act, yet in the limited numbers of cases in which courts martial have taken place, the victims have not had access to the proceedings and the results have not been conveyed to them.8 Furthermore, the Public Security Act (1989) provides immunity for any acts committed by State officials in good faith during the course of duty. 9 Therefore, even if the case was investigated and brought before the courts, the accused members of the Army would most probably invoke those provisions in order to avoid prosecution. Moreover, a thriving culture of impunity surrounding members of the security forces in Nepal prevents the effectiveness and availability of domestic remedies. The complaint 3.1 The author submits that the lethal force used against his daughter was disproportionate and unnecessary, and violated article 6 of the Covenant. Furthermore, since no effective investigations have been undertaken to date into his daughter’s killing, the State party is also in breach of its obligations under article 6, read in conjunction with article 2, paragraph 3, of the Covenant. Moreover, the author claims that the criminal justice system of Nepal provides no procedural guarantees for a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal, which constitutes an additional violation of article 6, read in conjunction with article 2, paragraph 3, of the Covenant. There is little independence and impartiality in the State party in cases in which a State agent is the defendant. 3.2 The author is concerned that a military court could be convened in the present case, instead of those responsible being tried in civilian courts. Decisions made by military tribunals cannot be appealed and hearings are closed to the public. A trial before a military court would be in breach of his rights under article 6, read in conjunction with article 2, paragraph 3, of the Covenant.10 Furthermore, the penalties handed down by military courts are not commensurate with the violations suffered, as they are purely disciplinary. That constitutes a further breach of article 6, read in conjunction with article 2, paragraph 3. 3.3 The author submits that the circumstances of Subhadra’s arrest and execution amount to a violation of article 7 of the Covenant. The fact that the first weapon fired at her failed amounted to a mock execution, even if that was unintentional. That amounts to a breach of article 7 of the Covenant. Furthermore, his daughter was attacked, shot and then brutally beaten, which is also a violation of article 7. 3.4 The author argues that the verbal abuse and death threats directed at his daughter before she was killed amount to degrading treatment and constitute a violation of article 7. He underlines that Subhadra was repeatedly called a “slut”, a word with strong sexual connotations, intended to degrade both Subhadra and the author himself. 7 8 9 10 6 Police Act, chap. 6. “Waiting for Justice”, p. 48. Public Security Act, sect. 22. The author refers to principle 29 of the updated Set of Principles for the protection and promotion of human rights through action to combat impunity (E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1).