58 GÄFGEN v. GERMANY JUDGMENT – SEPARATE OPINIONS JOINT PARTLY CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGES TULKENS, ZIEMELE AND BIANKU (Translation) 1. With regard to Article 3 of the Convention, we agree with the conclusion reached in the judgment1 that the applicant may still claim to be a “victim” within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention and that Article 3 has therefore been breached. However, our reasoning on the issue of the applicant’s victim status differs from that adopted by the majority. 2. In order to determine whether or not the applicant had lost his status as a victim, the Court was required to examine, in accordance with its caselaw, whether the domestic authorities had acknowledged and afforded redress for the alleged breach of Article 3. 3. The breach was indisputably acknowledged since the judicial authorities expressly admitted that the methods of investigation employed constituted “ill-treatment” and could not be justified on the ground of “necessity”, which was not a defence to a violation of the absolute protection of human dignity under Article 1 of the Basic Law and Article 3 of the Convention. 4. However, the judgment considers that appropriate and sufficient redress was not afforded, basing that finding on what it views as shortcomings in the conduct of the criminal proceedings resulting in the police officers’ conviction. While it finds that the criminal investigation in respect of the police officers who threatened the applicant with torture was compatible with the requirements of the Convention, the same does not apply to the penalties imposed on the police officers. The judgment concludes that they were not “adequate” and were “manifestly disproportionate” to the seriousness of the offence; accordingly, they did not have “the necessary deterrent effect in order to prevent further violations of the prohibition of ill-treatment in future difficult situations” (see paragraphs 123 and 124 of the judgment). 5. Admittedly, this assessment by the Court of the scope of the State’s duty to punish is not new and has been found in many previous judgments. However, in our view it raises three questions, especially in the present case. Firstly, sentencing is one of the most delicate and difficult tasks in the administration of criminal justice. It requires a range of factors to be taken into account, as well as knowledge of, and hence closeness to, the facts, situations and persons concerned. It is normally the role of the national courts and not the Court, which should involve itself in this process only 1. However, with regard to Article 6 of the Convention, we consider, unlike the majority, that there was a violation of that Article, and we refer to the joint partly dissenting opinion of Judges Rozakis, Tulkens, Jebens, Ziemele, Bianku and Power.