9.11.2017 A & Ors v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] EWCA Civ 1123 (11 August 2004) 60. Following detailed analysis of submissions made on behalf of the Appellants, the Commission stated, at paragraph 109, that "it is necessary to understand the overlap between the various groups and individuals, and how they connect to Al Qa'eda, to realise why the derogation is expressed as it is". 61. Following further analysis, the Commission concluded, at paragraph 110: "But, in our judgment, if those groups also support Al Qa'eda for a part of their agenda and an individual supports them nonetheless, it is a legitimate inference that he is supporting and assisting Al Qa'eda through his support for that group, whatever his own views may be on the indiscriminate killing of civilians, in the absence of evidence showing that the group has compartmentalised operations and is not assisted in other activities by the support given for e.g. self defence purposes. Indeed the Act requires only that there be support or assistance for an international terrorist group. The derogation requires that there be a link between that group and Al Qa'eda. It is sufficient that there is that indirect connection to Al Qa'eda. It is not necessary that the assistance be in connection with the Al Qa'eda facet. A group can be strengthened through support in one area and thus better able to carry out activities in another in a number of ways: publicity for fund raising and recruitment, the diversion of resources supplied for one purpose to another, the dual use of resources, the ability to retain resources which would otherwise have to be spent for another purpose. It is also unwise to suppose that there is a readily discernible and closely observed distinction between one activity and another within a terrorist group with many agendas. They all feed off each other. The same person who does fundraising or false documentation for one purpose is able to do it for other purposes; accommodation for one can be used for another; someone radicalised through jihadic experiences and indoctrination in Chechnya may see the violent global jihad as a next step. There is room for debate as to what has been called unwitting assistance which we deal with later." 62. The Commission recognised, in paragraph 112, the limitation to be placed upon its approach: "We do recognise that it is possible to construct connections, which by a number of links in a chain, can reach Al Qa'eda but without having any sensible connection to any threat or any real substance. But it is unrealistic, given the lack of formal structure to Al Qa'eda, to its various associated groups or networks, or to the links between them, to define the connection in a way which suggests that no more than one remove or link is permissible in order for the link to the public emergency, derived as it is from the activities of Al Qa'eda and its associates, to be made. Any more analysis depends on the facts of the cases." 63. Following that detailed analysis, the Commission concluded: "The overlapping groups or cells: 302. We accept the broad assessment by the Respondent that there is a network, largely of North African extremists, in this country which makes up a number of groups or cells with overlapping members or supporters. They usually have origins in groups which had or may still have a national agenda, but whether that originating group does or does not have a national agenda, whether or not is has direct Al Qa'eda links, whether or not the factions are at war in the country of origin, such as the GIA and GSPC in Algeria, those individuals now work together here. They co-operate in order to pursue at least in part an anti-West terrorist agenda. Those less formal groups are connected back to Al Qa'eda, either through the group from which they came which is part of what can be described as the Al Qa'eda network, or from other extremist individuals connected to Al Qa'eda who can be described as part of Al Qa'eda itself or associated with it. They are at least influenced from outside the United Kingdom. These informal, ad-hoc, overlapping networks, cells or groups constitute "groups" for the purpose of the 2001 Act. 303. It does not matter whether the individuals support all the means of war or terror urged by Al Qa'eda, including the deliberate mass killing of civilians by suicide actions. They can still support or assist a group connected with Al Qa'eda and in some way http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2004/1123.html 15/113