9.11.2017 A & Ors v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] EWCA Civ 1123 (11 August 2004) Doha Group) and is itself part of the Al Qa'eda network or a network linked to Al Qa'eda". A UN Monitoring Report of August 2002… described Al Qa'eda as 'a series of loosely connected operational and support cells.' A diagram annexed to it illustrated what was meant: at the centre of an oval was Al Qa'eda, linked by arrows to the cardinal points where were marked four distinct but interlinked entities: the strategic decision-making structure, the base force for guerrilla warfare in Afghanistan, the loose coalition of transnational terrorist and guerrilla groups, and the global terrorist network. Links around the circumference of the oval connected to those groups. 99. We accept that general schematic description of Al Qa'eda and its associated networks; it was borne out by all the evidence which we heard and was not the subject of serious debate. Terrorist groups have historically worked in small cells, often disconnected from each other with deliberate cut-outs in the chain of command, with direct communication at operational level to the leadership hierarchy discouraged… [W]e accept Mr Williams' submission as to what connections and with whom had to be shown for the purposes of the derogation and in very summary form his submission as to why, if such connections are shown, it shows the link to the public emergency and why the threat is increased. Of course, Mr Williams is using the word "link" in its specific statutory meaning. Mr Williams submitted that it would be an unwarranted restriction on the scope of the emergency to require the group of which an Appellant was a member or to which he was "linked" in the statutory sense to be a supporter of the core aims of Al Qa'eda as expressed in the February 1998 fatwa. That was one core aim or statement of intent and means but not the only objective. Its objectives were a combination of the global and national, the latter being part of and assisting the former and vice versa. It was not necessary to show that an individual supported that fatwa in order to show, to the requisite standard of proof that he was both an international terrorist and connected to the public emergency." 219. Mr Gill offers no substantial challenge – indeed, no challenge at all – to these findings. Nor could he sensibly do so. They are based on a very large body of evidence considered by SIAC over many weeks. In those circumstances it is in my judgment all the more difficult to quarrel with SIAC's rejection of the submissions made by Mr Macdonald and Mr Gill: "108… [W]e are of the view that the formulation by Mr MacDonald of the link to Al Qa'eda and those associated with it, as requiring support for a core aim of global jihad, expressed in the indiscriminate killing of civilians, is too narrow an approach. It is not necessary for adherence to that core aim of Al Qa'eda, expressed in the 1998 fatwa, to be the point of overlap between the GSPC, GIA, Al Qa'eda or the Appellants. Similarly, Mr Gill's submission that there has to be support for the core aims of global jihad against the West by terrorist means is too narrow. The threat to the life of the nation is not so confined although that is an obvious part of it. The threat is not confined to activities which may take place within the United Kingdom for the nation's life includes its national activities abroad whether diplomatic, cultural or in civil aviation and tourism. Nor would it necessarily be right to suppose, in the light of Rehman, that the nation's life cannot be threatened by attacks upon other countries who are allies, friends or vital sources of material for the economy such as oil. This threat could come directly from the disruption created by such attacks, or indirectly from the strength which the terrorist may gain from such an attack in a world in which the interdependence of countries facing a global terrorist threat is obvious. The threat to the nation, which underlies the derogation, is posed by any of the various activities of Al Qa'eda and those who are associated with it, whether or not they agree with all aspects of his global agenda or with the indiscriminate killing of civilians as a means or end. 109. It is necessary to understand the overlap between the various groups and individuals, and how they connect to Al Qa'eda, to realise why the derogation is expressed as it is. Take the Arab Mujahaddin fighting in Chechnya: those who go there or support those who fight there with that group, connected as it is to Al Qa'eda, are assisting fighters with a radical Islamic agenda to train, and to gain experience and prestige which is capable of being deployed later for global jihad purposes or in the recruitment of others, radicalised http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2004/1123.html 54/113