CCPR/C/119/D/2681/2015 jurisprudence that considerable weight should be given to the assessment conducted by the State party and that it is generally for the organs of the States parties to the Covenant to review and evaluate facts and evidence in order to determine whether such risk exists,22 unless it is found that the evaluation was clearly arbitrary or amounted to a denial of justice.23 7.4 The Committee notes that, according to the authors, after they received their subsidiary protection, they faced homelessness and lived in an abandoned building with other refugees without adequate sanitary facilities and where alcohol was consumed openly, and were not able to find work. The Committee also notes the authors’ submissions that F.H.M. had serious difficulties in gaining access to health care during her pregnancy and the birth of their two children in Italy and that, when the author went into labour, the hospital rejected her since the authors did not have a health card because they lacked an official address. She was only able to be admitted to the hospital after an arrangement with the hospital was made by a third person, who was involved in assisting refugees. The Committee further notes that, after the authors went to Finland and were returned to Italy, they were not offered access to housing, medical care, social benefits or an integration programme by the Italian authorities. The Committee notes that, in 2012, the authors went to Sweden and then to Denmark, where they requested asylum in August 2012. 7.5 The Committee takes note of the various reports submitted by the authors. Furthermore, it notes that recent reports have highlighted the lack of available places in the reception facilities in Italy for asylum seekers and returnees under the Dublin II Regulation. The Committee notes in particular the authors’ submission that returnees, like them, who had already been granted a form of protection and benefited from the reception facilities when they were in Italy, are not entitled to accommodation in the Government reception centres for asylum seekers.24 7.6 The Committee takes note of the finding by the Refugee Appeals Board that Italy should be considered the “country of first asylum” in the present case and the position of the State party that the country of first asylum is obliged to provide asylum seekers with certain social and economic elements in accordance with basic human standards, although it is not required that such persons have exactly the same social and living standards as nationals of the country. The Committee further notes the reference made by the State party to a decision of the European Court of Human Rights according to which the fact that the applicants’ material and social living conditions would be significantly reduced if they were to be removed from the contracting State — Denmark — is not sufficient in itself to give rise to breach of article 3 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.25 7.7 The Committee recalls that States parties should, when reviewing challenges to decisions to remove individuals from their territory, give sufficient weight to the real and personal risk such individuals might face if deported.26 In particular, the evaluation of whether or not the removed individuals are likely to be exposed to conditions constituting 22 23 24 25 26 See communication No. 1957/2010, Lin v. Australia, Views adopted on 21 March 2013, para. 9.3. See, inter alia, ibid. and communication No. 541/1993, Errol Simms v. Jamaica, inadmissibility decision adopted on 3 April 1995, para. 6.2. See “Country report: Italy” (see footnote 14 above), p. 54-55. European Court of Human Rights, Samsam Mohammed Hussein and Others v. the Netherlands and Italy, application 27725/10, 2 April 2013. See for example, communications No. 1763/2008, Pillai v. Canada, Views adopted on 25 March 2011, paras.11.2 and 11.4; and Abdilafir Abubakar Ali et al v. Denmark (see footnote 20 above), para.7.8. 11