CAT/C/51/D/434/2010 4.7 The State party notes that the complainants also make claims about their treatment in the State party, which allegedly engages obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. In this connection, the State party submits that references to rights outside the Convention are inadmissible ratione materiae and will not address these claims. 4.8 Further, as concerns the allegations of the complainants under article 3 of the Convention that, should the State party return the complainant and his family to China, there would be substantial grounds for believing that they would be in danger of being subjected to torture, the State party notes that it is the responsibility of the complainants to establish a prima facie case for the purpose of admissibility of a claim under rule 113 (b) of the rules of procedure. 4.9 In light of the above, the State party observes that the complainants appear to claim that because of the complainant’s wife’s alleged previous forced termination of pregnancy and insertion of an IUD, should she be returned to China she would face future treatment amounting to torture. The State party maintains that this claim is inadmissible as they have not substantiated how the complainant’s wife is at risk of future adverse treatment in her present circumstances, or how possible future treatment would amount to torture within the meaning of article 1 of the Convention. The State party also maintains that the claim is manifestly ill-founded. 4.10 Furthermore, the State party submits that there are no substantial grounds for believing that the complainants would be subject to torture upon their return to China. It recalls that the onus of proving that there is “a foreseeable, real and personal risk of being subjected to torture” upon deportation rests with the complainants.6 The risk need not be “highly probable”, but it must be “assessed on grounds that go beyond mere theory and suspicion”.7 The Committee has further expressed the view that “the danger must be personal and present”.8 4.11 The State party submits that the complainants have not provided credible evidence to demonstrate that the main complainant would be personally at risk of adverse treatment, or that such treatment that he alleges may occur would amount to torture under article 1 of the Convention. 4.12 The State party further notes that the Committee has stated that, in exercising its jurisdiction pursuant to article 3 of the Convention, it will give considerable weight to findings of fact that are made by the State party concerned.9 While the Committee has rightly indicated that it is not bound to accept those findings and must freely make its own assessment of the facts, the State party submits that in this case the evidence before the Committee does not disclose a real risk of torture in relation to the complainant. In this respect, it notes that the Department of Immigration and Citizenship and later the Refugee Review Tribunal concluded that the main complainant will not “face any risk of harm for reasons of religion if he returns to China now or in the foreseeable future”. 6 7 8 9 6 Communication No. 203/2002, A. R. v. the Netherlands, decision adopted on 14 November 2003, para. 7.3. Communication No. 355/2008, C.M. v. Switzerland, decision adopted on 14 May 2010, para. 10.3. Communication No. 280/2005, Gamal El Rgeig v. Switzerland, decision adopted on 15 November 2006, paras. 6 and 7. Committee against Torture, general comment No. 1 on article 3 of the Convention in the context of article 22, para 9 (a).