B. Responsibility for the design of a reparations programme There seems to be a trend towards establishing truth commissions in post-conflict societies and societies in transition and entrusting them with making recommendations concerning reparations. However, it is worth remembering that many truth commissions have not been given this responsibility (e.g., Argentina and El Salvador18). Moreover, some truth commissions that did receive this mandate formulated recommendations that went unheeded or that have been implemented only partially (e.g., South Africa, Guatemala, Haiti and, at least until late 2006, Peru). Finally, some countries have implemented reparations initiatives that did not stem directly from truth commission recommendations (e.g., Argentina, Brazil and Germany). Countries can therefore decide the way to go about designing reparations measures that best suits their different contexts. However, to the extent that truth commissions continue to be a measure of choice for societies emerging from authoritarianism or conflict, this is probably how many reparations programmes will be articulated in the future. The advantage is that, first, in the course of their work, truth commissions can compile information about the victims which may be important in the design and implementation of reparations programmes—information which may otherwise be missing.19 Second, truth commissions normally enjoy a very high degree of moral capital, and this might have a positive impact on how their recommendations on reparations are perceived. At least initially, it makes sense to think that recommendations stemming from a truth commission will be more credible than a plan developed solely by Government authorities. This is because, given their membership (most commissions include civil society representatives) but also their general purpose, it is easier for truth commissions than for ordinary Government institutions to establish participatory processes leading to the design of reparations programmes.20 Finally, and importantly, it is easier to create both the reality and the perception of significant links between a reparations programme and other justice initiatives, including, of course, truth-seeking, if the responsibility for designing the former is primarily given to the entity in charge of designing a comprehensive transitional justice strategy. Nevertheless, truth commissions, even those with high moral capital, are not necessarily strong political players over time. The fact that more often than not their recommendations are not binding means that Governments can ignore them. Even if they are binding, this does not guar18 19 20 Part of the Commission on the Truth for El Salvador’s mandate was to recommend “legal, political or administrative measures” which could be “inferred from the results of the investigation,” including “measures to prevent the repetition of such acts, and initiatives to promote national reconciliation.” See Mexico Agreements, 27 April 1991. In Colombia, for example, the discussions about reparation have taken place without much information about the number of victims, their socio-economic profile or even their location. By contrast, by the time South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission published its report, including its recommendations on reparation, it had collected a large amount of information about the potential beneficiaries. However, not all truth commissions do this and many have in fact been criticized for becoming distant from civil society, even if they included several commissioners with civil society backgrounds and were mindful of the importance of communicating with different stakeholders. 11