CCPR/C/121/D/2610/2015 8. Both an alleged paramilitary and a former member of the National Guard informed investigators that Joe Luis Castillo González’s name was on a paramilitary hit list and that the mayor was aware of the activities of the paramilitary group, which operated with his collusion and acquiescence (paras. 2.8 and 7.3). Specifically, the former paramilitary witness indicated that Mr. Castillo’s murder had been committed by presumed Colombian paramilitaries with the support of Venezuelan local authorities. The former National Guard member stated: “these guys are paracos (paramilitaries) hired by various cattle ranchers in the area; Mayor Toto Márquez knows about it, and in fact his own drivers take these guys to and from different places; they have come to cleanse Machiques of all the scum; they are scary guys because they don’t respect anybody”.1 The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, however, never took a formal statement under oath from these individuals or otherwise attempted to determine the accuracy of these claims. Before the Committee, it merely contends that the information they provided was “very general” (para. 6.12). 9. In May 2007, six months after the case was closed, another individual accused the mayor of responsibility for the murder. The prosecutor took over three years to summon this person to an interview — in July 2010 and May 2011 — and there is no evidence that the interview ever took place. 10. Failure to vigorously investigate the responsibility of State agents and paramilitaries has lain at the heart of much of the impunity for violations against human rights defenders in Latin America. This is the space where States have most frequently failed to fulfil their due diligence obligations to conduct effective investigations and ensure accountability, and it remains an ongoing concern for the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.2 11. The Committee has long established that investigations into violations of article 6 must always be independent, impartial, prompt, thorough, effective, credible and transparent. States parties must take appropriate measures to establish the truth relating to the events leading to the deprivation of life, including revealing the reasons for targeting certain individuals.3 12. The Committee, however, never addresses whether it would consider the investigation into Joe Castillo’s murder to be adequate under the Covenant as a matter of first impression. It instead defers to the Inter-American Court’s finding of no violation. The Committee does so suggesting that it is deferring to the factual determinations of the Court, as a result of its ability to “engage in collection and analysis of evidence, including witness testimonies” (para. 9.6). 13. Nowhere, however, does the Committee mention the legal standard that the Court applied in reaching its conclusion. That standard appears at paragraph 153 of the Court’s opinion, as follows: [T]he Commission and the representatives mentioned procedures which, in their view, should have been carried out. For the purposes of this analysis, only those ordered by the authorities will be taken into account. The Court will not consider possible specific investigative measures which, according to the arguments of the Commission or the representatives, should have been carried out and that were not ordered by the authorities. This is so because, in principle, it is not up to the Court to determine the appropriateness or utility of specific investigative actions or measures, unless the failure to take them is contrary to objective standards, or is manifestly unreasonable. In short, the Court refused to examine the adequacy of the investigation in the light of its potential scope, but limited its assessment of the investigation to the scope defined by the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. 1 2 3 14 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Castillo González et al. v. Venezuela, Judgment of 27 November 2012, paras. 33−34. Concluding observations on the fourth periodic report of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (CCPR/C/VEN/CO/4), para. 14 (b). General comment No. 36 (2018) on the right to life, para. 28.