CAT/OP/NLD/1 a separate legal basis for the NPM. This perception of interdependence is a significant obstacle to the public and to civil society and has been raised by associated institutions as a barrier to collaboration. In a given example, a recent initiative to examine the conditions for life-time prisoners, a politically sensitive topic, led to controversy and was not pursued. Further, despite assurances of functional independence, any autonomy which is currently practically enjoyed by NPM members is not institutionally guaranteed for the future. 38. The SPT therefore recommends that the State party clearly separate the mandate of its inspectorates and the RSJ from that of the NPM or identify segregated NPM functions within these institutions which can be performed completely autonomously, in line with the NPM Guidelines. The NPM should complement existing systems of oversight in the Netherlands, and its establishment should take into account effective cooperation and coordination between preventive mechanisms in the country, without precluding the creation or operation of other such complementary systems. 39. The Subcommittee further encourages the enactment of legislation that ensures the functional and operational independence of the NPM, with due consideration to the Paris Principles. Coverage of places of detention 40. One important limitation in the work of the NPM is the lack of clarity on how the State party will implement OPCAT provisions in the Caribbean Netherlands, including in the Bonaire, St. Eustatius and Saba islands (“BES Islands”). During its visit, the SPT learned that a supervisory council has been established in the BES islands, and that IVenJ, IJZ and IGZ have each conducted initial visits to places of detention in these locations. However, despite the recommendations of the Committee against Torture and the Committee on Enforced Disappearances that the OPCAT be applied equally in the Caribbean Netherlands,7 the Subcommittee notes that the full NPM does not conduct preventive activities on these islands in a routine and regular manner. RSJ, for example, does not have jurisdiction overseas, which creates a gap in the NPM’s ability to provide policy advice with respect to these locations. In addition, the inspectorates have not carried out joint activities in the Caribbean. This gap in monitoring is concerning, given reported lack of safeguards and ill-treatment, among other human rights concerns, in these locations.8 41. In addition to gaps in OPCAT implementation in the Caribbean Netherlands, the SPT is concerned that the Netherlands NPM does not monitor places of detention in the Netherlands which are leased by other states and accommodating persons detained by those states. Members of the Netherlands NPM understand that the NPMs of sending states have the mandate to monitor such places. However, one sending state is not a State party to the OPCAT and thus has not designated an NPM. At the same time, the NPM of another sending state has expressed concern that it is practically precluded from monitoring these facilities. For example, law enforcement personnel in the concerned facility, who should be interviewed and advised by the NPM, are apparently recruited by the State party, not by the sending state. Further, even with the authority to conduct visits within prison facilities, the NPM of the sending state is nevertheless restricted in monitoring related institutions and systems in the Netherlands — such as the overall provision of health care to detainees as compared to that provided outside of detention — which should be monitored in conjunction with facility visits for the purposes of preventing torture and ill-treatment. 7 8 8 CAT/C/NLD/CO/5-6, June 2013, para. 28; CED/C/NLD/CO/1, 10 April 2014, paras. 24-25. See, e.g., CAT/C/NLD/CO/5-6, June 2013, paras. 10, 19.