CCPR/C/130/D/2671/2015 7.6 On the other hand, the Committee notes that the State party has challenged the admissibility and substance of these claims, and that the State party agrees with the assessment by the Refugee Appeals Board, which, while accepting some elements of the author’s statements as facts, found that the author had failed to establish that there were substantial grounds for believing that he would be at a specific and real personal risk of irreparable harm – namely of being killed or subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment – if he were returned to Afghanistan. 7.7 The Committee recalls paragraph 12 of its general comment No. 31 (2004) on the nature of the general legal obligation imposed on States parties to the Covenant, in which it refers to the obligation of States parties not to extradite, deport, expel or otherwise remove a person from their territory when there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of irreparable harm, such as that contemplated in articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant. 10 The Committee has also indicated that the risk must be personal and that there is a high threshold for providing substantial grounds for establishing that a real risk of irreparable harm exists.11 Thus, all relevant facts and circumstances must be considered, including the general human rights situation in the author’s country of origin.12 7.8 The Committee recalls that it is generally for the organs of States parties to examine the facts and evidence of the case in order to determine whether such a risk exists, unless it can be established that the assessment was arbitrary or amounted to a manifest error or denial of justice.13 7.9 In the present case, the Committee notes that the Refugee Appeals Board pointed to several contradictions in the author’s accounts of the facts and that, even though the Board did not contest the fact that the author had worked for the Afghan Government, it considered that he was unable to establish that his work had led to a perpetual conflict with the Taliban, which was allegedly manifested in several verbal and written threats addressed to the author. The Committee considers that, while the author disagrees with the factual conclusions of the State party’s authorities, the information before the Committee does not indicate that those findings were clearly arbitrary or amounted to a manifest error or denial of justice. In this respect, the Committee notes the alleged errors of interpretation during the asylum hearings, but also notes that the author failed to explain how and to what extent the allegedly erroneous interpretation had distorted his statements, which were ultimately deemed inconsistent by the domestic authorities and which led the authorities to conclude there were no substantial grounds for believing that returning the author to Afghanistan would constitute a violation of his rights under articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant. Furthermore, the Committee notes the State party’s arguments that the author failed to provide any plausible explanation as to why he had not raised the issue any earlier in the proceedings, especially on occasions when he had been requested to confirm that he had properly understood the interpreter. The Committee is mindful of the Board’s reasoning that it did not afford decisive weight to isolated inconsistencies, but conducted an overall assessment of the author’s statements and other information available on file. 7.10 The Committee considers that the author has not established a sufficient basis for his claim that the evaluation of his asylum application by the Danish authorities was clearly arbitrary or amounted to a manifest error or denial of justice. 14 Consequently, without prejudice to the continuing responsibility of the State party to take into account the situation in the country to which the author would be deported and not underestimating the concerns that may legitimately be expressed with respect to the general human rights situation in Afghanistan, the Committee considers that, in the light of the available information regarding the author’s personal circumstances, the author’s claims under articles 6 and 7 of the 10 11 12 13 14 See also A v. Denmark (CCPR/C/116/D/2357/2014), para. 7.4. For example, A and B v. Denmark, para. 8.3. Ibid. See also X v. Canada (CCPR/C/115/D/2366/2014), para. 9.3, and X v. Norway (CCPR/C/115/D/2474/2014), para. 7.3. For example, K v. Denmark (CCPR/C/114/D/2393/2014), para. 7.4, and I.M.Y. v. Denmark, (CCPR/C/117/D/2559/2015), para. 7.6. For example, A v. Denmark, para. 7.4. 7