CAT/OP/BOL/3 for avoiding imprisonment and that such requests sometimes come straight from judges and prosecutors themselves; (f) Non-compliance with the maximum period for pretrial detention of 24 months established in the Code of Criminal Procedure, which occurs because judges do not exercise due oversight in respect of the duration of pretrial detention. The Subcommittee was informed that the Public Prosecution Service has a system for registering and monitoring criminal cases, but, according to the information gathered by the Subcommittee (including information on a documented case in which a person had been in pretrial detention for 10 years), the system does not issue alerts when time limits are exceeded, chiefly because public officials do not enter the necessary information into the system; (g) The existence of legislation that is conducive to the imposition of pretrial detention. Procedural risk assessments are subject to arbitrary interpretations by judges of, for example, the provisions regarding cases in which a defendant may pose a danger to society or a flight risk. 30. The Subcommittee urges the State party to undertake the formulation of a criminal justice policy that, incorporating an approach that takes into consideration both vulnerability and human rights, does away with the widespread use of pretrial detention and favours restorative forms of justice. 31. The Subcommittee also urges the State party to implement the recommendations made in its 2010 report on which action has not yet been taken, in particular those presented in paragraphs 56 and 143.16 32. In addition, the Subcommittee recommends that the State party: (a) Uphold the principle of the independence of judges and adopt an effective strategy to prevent them from being harassed; (b) Adopt mechanisms for detecting and sanctioning corrupt practices; (c) Ensure that the conditions for granting non-custodial measures are commensurate with the social and economic means of the accused and give suitable consideration to the customs and way of life of indigenous peoples in keeping with the spirit of the country’s Constitution; (d) Inspect court records to identify cases in which the administration of justice is delayed and conduct regular, independent judicial reviews of the length and conditions of pretrial detention. B. Delegation of authority, self-government and corruption 33. During its 2010 visit, the Subcommittee noted the existence of “a parallel system of ‘internal governance’ in prisons throughout the country” and expressed concern that selfgovernment was an instrument of “social control and discipline”. The Subcommittee noted that there was a system of “orderly coexistence” between the prison system and the selfgoverning section committees in the form of unwritten agreements granting certain freedoms and privileges.17 34. Seven years later, the Subcommittee noted that the prisoners’ system of selfgovernment was more firmly established than it had been during the Subcommittee’s previous visit. A first point to be made in this connection is that self-government gives rise to greater inequalities in the material conditions in which prisoners are housed. In San Pedro Prison, Mocoví Men’s Prison, San Sebastián Men’s Prison and San Roque Prison, the inmate-led governance structure determines job assignments in areas related to material 16 17 8 Véase ibíd., párr. 54, relativo a la capacitación a jueces y operadores de justicia para una correcta aplicación e interpretación de la normativa relacionada con medidas alternativas a la detención; y párr. 143 relativo a un mejor uso de las medidas sustitutivas, la aceleración de los procesos que permitan una reducción de la detención preventiva, y la aplicación restringida y motivada por parte de las autoridades judiciales de la detención preventiva. Ibíd., párr. 159. GE.18-12272