86 One possible challenge is that the prison governor has largely delegated the authority to decide on the use of solitary confinement to the operative senior officer, inspector or duty officer.271 Even though it may be necessary to delegate such authority, the prison governor must be expected to keep updated as regards developments in his or her own prison and to assess the use of measures on a running basis. Prevention also requires that the measure is ­discontinued as soon as the conditions for solitary confinement are no longer present, and that active efforts are made to replace solitary confinement by less intrusive measures. In several prisons, we have found long stays in security cells, in some cases of up to 16 days’ duration. The majority of security cell ­supervision protocols have major shortcomings in that they do not document continual efforts to establish a good dialogue or otherwise create conditions whereby inmates can be returned to their own cell (see section 9.5 Control of the use of security cells and restraint beds). Special Report to the Storting Document 4:3 (2018–2019) United Kingdom: guidance on the use of isolation In 2017, the UK national preventive mechanism published comprehensive guidelines on how isolation should be prevented by the competent authorities. Particular emphasis was given to preventing the use of isolation: Detaining authorities should aspire to prevent or eliminate the use of isolation by focusing on the root causes of incidents that lead to its use, with a specific focus on repeated episodes and self-isolation. Note: UK NPM, Guidance: Isolation in detention, January 2017. Among other things, the Parliamentary Ombudsman has recommended to use motivational conversations and the possibility of going out into the open air to create a good dialogue with a view to speeding up the inmate’s return to a regular prison cell. We have also ­recommended that a programme for the speediest ­possible return should be drawn up in the case of ­prolonged exclusion from the company of other inmates. Main findings Our findings indicate that there is a need to strengthen the work of the Correctional Service in order to prevent situations and incidents that trigger solitary ­confinement. The current regulatory framework does not confer on the Correctional Service any duty to put systematic effort into such prevention. The current ­legislation falls short of meeting Norway’s ­commitments under international law to prevent ­situations that entail a risk of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. The lack of accurate information undermines the ability of both prisons and governing authorities to effectively prevent the use of solitary confinement. There are likewise no central guidelines on what the individual prison should do to prevent self-isolation or ­solitary confinement as a result of suicide risk. The lack of national minimum standards for association with ­other inmates also undermines the possibility of ­preventing solitary confinement and the detrimental effects of isolation. The lack of training and guidelines on how staff should follow up inmates in security cells to ensure as brief a stay as possible has the same effect. 271 Reports sent to the Parliamentary Ombudsman: Directorate of the Norwegian Correctional Service (2015). Rapport om utelukkelser i kriminalomsorgen (’Report on exclusions in the Correctional Service’), Table 2.4. Overview of the number of decision-makers and their rank. 87