provide for a clear, understandable, singular, hier- The ODIHR election observation experiarchical complaints and appeals process that de- ence has shown that this is an important fines the role of each level of election commission area in which some States have not fared and each level of court. The last instance for a hear- well. Delay and uncertainty in the estabing should always be a court, regardless of the intro- lishment of election results threaten to induction of appeals of first or second instance within fringe upon electoral rights, which, in turn, the election administration. This process must also undermines the commitment contained in para. 7.9 of the Copenhagen Document, identify which bodies act as fact-finding bodies of which is designed to ensure that candifirst instance and which bodies act as appellate re- dates who obtain the necessary number view bodies. In order to comply with OSCE com- of votes are duly installed in office. mitments, authorities must provide access to full details concerning the handling of each complaint or appeal, including the decision of the dispute-resolution body and its justification. Election complaints and appeals should be heard in public hearings and considered in an expedited and effective manner that permits them to be resolved within deadlines established by law, and without delay of the determination, announcement, and publication of results. In addition to public access and transparency, the results and reasons for decisions on complaints and appeals should be formally adopted, issued in written form, and announced publicly or possibly published on the website of the institution. Overall, the protection of electoral rights is critical for the support of four fundamental pillars for democratic elections: public confidence, universal and equal suffrage, transparency, and accountability. An additional element may therefore be mentioned in this regard: not only should there be mechanisms for effective remedies to protect electoral rights, there must also be sufficient and proportional criminal or administrative penalties to deter violations of the law and prevent injury to suffrage rights. However, care must be taken not to create a system in which politically motivated and unsubstantiated charges are easily brought against opponents. Ñ Freedom of assembly and association 43. As OSCE States have recognized, freedom of assembly and association are fundamental cornerstones of a free, democratic society. 31 In some States, however, these rights are under threat from a range of excessively restrictive laws and policies that do not always respect the principles of proportionality, legality, nondiscrimination, or the requirements of good Limitations to the freedom of assembly within the OSCE region include the outright banning of asadministration and transparency of the deci- semblies critical of the government or its policies; sion-making process. the placing of excessive burdens on assembly organizers or unwarranted restrictions on the time, 44. The freedom of assembly is often under- place, and type of assemblies; the denial of ademined by authorities who impose unneces- quate protection to participants of peaceful assemsarily restrictive measures as a result of an blies against third parties, such as counter-protestors; and an unnecessarily repressive attitude toexcessively wide interpretation of legitimate wards simultaneous and spontaneous assemblies. grounds for limitations. Also, in too many participating States, freedom of assembly is regulated through a system of requiring permission from the authorities before an assembly can take place, rather than through the prefer31  For the freedom of association, see the 1990 Copenhagen Document, specifically paras. 7, 7.6, 9, 9.3, 10, 10.3, and 10.4; for the freedom of assembly, see id., paras. 9 and 9.2. Common Responsibility: Commitments and Implementation 17