90 325 should be released. This is independent of whether there is still a risk to the proceedings. That is, even when the circumstances of the case indicate that, once released, the accused will attempt to evade justice or disrupt the investigation, he or she should no longer be 326 deprived of his or her liberty under the precautionary measure. 228. The fact that many criminal codes refer first to pretrial detention and then provide what they call “alternatives to pretrial detention” suggests and fosters an interpretation whereby pretrial detention is the first measure deemed applicable. On the contrary, according to international human rights law, pretrial detention should be the ultima ratio. In other words, it should be the measure of last resort, to be invoked when other less restrictive measures are inadequate to ensure the purpose of the proceedings. 229. Consequently, in practice, it should be the prosecutor who argues and demonstrates why, in a given case, other precautionary measures of a non-custodial nature would not be appropriate or adequate. In turn, the judge must assess the possibility of the risk of the proceedings being neutralized through non-custodial measures and, if he chooses to impose pretrial detention, he is required to specify sufficient grounds and reasons for its necessity and proportionality. This approach would also guarantee the effective exercise of the right of defense, in that a step-bystep, gradual analysis (from the least to the most restrictive measure) would allow the defense team to focus the discussion on concrete matters related to the necessity and proportionality of the measures under consideration. 230. In addition, as with pretrial detention, the existence of sufficient evidence linking the accused to the facts under investigation is a sine qua non 327 requirement or condition for the application of other precautionary measures. Moreover, since some of those measures also restrict the enjoyment of other rights, 328 they should also be imposed in such as the right to freedom of movement, 329 accordance with the principles of legality, necessity and proportionality that govern restrictions of rights in a democratic society. Thus, pursuant to the guarantees established in Articles 8 and 25 of the American Convention and XVIII and XXVI of the American Declaration, decisions whereby non-custodial measures are imposed must 325 IACHR, Third Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Paraguay, Ch. IV, para. 33. 326 IACHR, Report No. 86/09, Case 12.553, Merits, Jorge, José, and Dante Peirano Basso, Uruguay, August 6, 2009, para. 134. 327 IACHR, Principles and Best Practices on the Protection of Persons Deprived of Liberty in the Americas, Principle III(2). 328 The right to freedom of movement and residence (Art. 22 of the American Convention), understood as the right of all persons to move freely from one place to another and to establish themselves in the place of their choice, is an essential condition for individuals to be able to live their lives freely. I/A Court H.R., Case of Ricardo Canese v. Paraguay. Judgment of August 31, 2004. Series C No. 111, para. 115. 329 See, mutatis mutandis, I/A Court H.R., Case of Ricardo Canese v. Paraguay. Judgment of August 31, 2004. Series C No. 111, paras. 123 et seq.