CAT/OP/MNG/1 (b) The mandate and powers of the national preventive mechanism should be clearly set out in a constitutional or legislative text, and the operational independence of the mechanism should be guaranteed by law and in practice; (c) The members of the national preventive mechanism should be independent and impartial and must have the requisite capabilities and professional knowledge, including medical, psychological and other related expertise to effectively fulfil its functions; (d) The national preventive mechanism should have sufficient personnel to ensure that it can fulfil its functions under the Optional Protocol and that it has the operational capacity corresponding to the number of places of detention within the scope of its mandate; (e) The necessary resources should be provided to permit the effective operation of the national preventive mechanism, and the national preventive mechanism should enjoy complete financial and operational autonomy when carrying out its functions under the Optional Protocol. Resources should be assured through a separate line in the annual budget and should be predictable, to allow the national preventive mechanism to develop its annual workplan and visits and plan its cooperation with other partners; (f) The national preventive mechanism should complement rather than replace existing systems of oversight in Mongolia, and its establishment should take into account effective cooperation and coordination between preventive mechanisms in the country and not preclude the creation or operation of other such complementary systems; (g) The State party should ensure that the national preventive mechanism is able to carry out visits in the manner and with the frequency determined by the mechanism. This includes the ability to conduct private interviews with those deprived of liberty and the right to carry out unannounced visits at all times to all places of deprivation of liberty, in accordance with the provisions of the Optional Protocol; (h) The national preventive mechanism should play a prominent role in in the country’s system for prevention of torture and ill-treatment, with a high degree of institutional and public visibility. In that regard, the Subcommittee stresses the importance of increasing public awareness of the mandate and work of the mechanism and the need for it to be recognized as a key component in that system. III. Overarching issues A. Institutional framework 23. The Subcommittee notes that the State party has recently made wide-ranging reforms to its criminal justice system, including significant amendments to the Criminal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure. It is also aware that many places of detention have recently been renewed or refurbished and welcomes this as part of an ongoing programme. Although many of the resulting changes are commendable, problems remain. In particular, the Subcommittee is concerned that responsibility for policing, justice and health care in detention all lies with the Ministry of Justice and Home Affairs. This may result in serious conflicts of interest, can be detrimental to the effective management of the criminal justice and detention systems and is inappropriate in terms of prevention, because it omits the separation of powers. 24. The Subcommittee recommends that responsibility for policing and for justice be located in separate ministries and that responsibility for health-care and medical services in places of detention should be moved to the Ministry of Health. 6