CCPR/C/117/D/2225/2012 8.5 The Committee considers that the author’s claims under articles 14 (7) and 18 (1) of the Covenant are sufficiently substantiated for the purposes of admissibility, declares them admissible and proceeds to their examination on the merits. Consideration of the merits 9.1 The Committee has considered the communication in the light of all the information made available to it by the parties, as provided for under article 5 (1) of the Optional Protocol. 9.2 The Committee notes the author’s claim that his rights under article 18 (1) of the Covenant have been violated due to the absence in the State party of an alternative to compulsory military service, as a result of which his refusal to perform military service because of his religious beliefs led to his criminal prosecution and subsequent conviction. The Committee takes note of the State party’s submission that the criminal offence committed by the author was determined accurately according to the Criminal Code of Turkmenistan and that pursuant to article 41 of the Constitution, the protection of Turkmenistan is the sacred duty of every citizen and that general conscription is compulsory for male citizens. 9.3 The Committee recalls its general comment No. 22 (1993) on freedom of thought, conscience or religion, in which it considers that the fundamental character of the freedoms enshrined in article 18 (1) is reflected in the fact that this provision cannot be derogated from, even in time of public emergency, as stated in article 4 (2) of the Covenant. The Committee recalls its prior jurisprudence stating that although the Covenant does not explicitly refer to a right of conscientious objection, such a right derives from article 18, inasmuch as the obligation to be involved in the use of lethal force may seriously conflict with the freedom of thought, conscience and religion. 10 The right to conscientious objection to military service inheres in the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. It entitles any individual to an exemption from compulsory military service if such service cannot be reconciled with that individual’s religion or beliefs. The right must not be impaired by coercion. A State may, if it wishes, compel the objector to undertake a civilian alternative to military service, outside the military sphere and not under military command. The alternative service must not be of a punitive nature. It must be a real service to the community and compatible with respect for human rights. 11 9.4 In the present case, the Committee considers that the author’s refusal to be drafted for compulsory military service derives from his religious beliefs and that the author’s subsequent conviction and sentence amounted to an infringement of his freedom of thought, conscience and religion in breach of article 18 (1) of the Covenant. In this context, the Committee recalls that repression of the refusal to be drafted for compulsory military service, exercised against persons whose conscience or religion prohibits the use of arms, is 10 11 6 See communications Nos. 1321/2004 and 1322/2004, Yeo-Bum Yoon and Myung-Jin Choi v. the Republic of Korea, Views adopted on 3 November 2006, para. 8.3; No. 1786/2008, Jong-nam Kim et al. v. the Republic of Korea, Views adopted on 25 October 2012, para. 7.3; Atasoy and Sarkut v. Turkey, paras. 10.4 and 10.5; No. 2179/2012, Young-kwan Kim et al. v. the Republic of Korea, Views adopted on 15 October 2014, para. 7.4; Abdullayev v. Turkmenistan, para. 7.7; Mahmud Hudaybergenov v. Turkmenistan, para. 7.5; Ahmet Hudaybergenov v. Turkmenistan, para. 7.5; and Japparow v. Turkmenistan, para. 7.6. See communications Nos. 1642-1741/2007, Min-Kyu Jeong et al. v. the Republic of Korea, Views adopted on 24 March 2011, para. 7.3; Jong-nam Kim et al. v. the Republic of Korea, para. 7.4; Abdullayev v. Turkmenistan, para. 7.7; Mahmud Hudaybergenov v. Turkmenistan, para. 7.5; Ahmet Hudaybergenov v. Turkmenistan, para. 7.5; and Japparow v. Turkmenistan, para. 7.6.