In Othman (Abu Qatada) v. the United Kingdom, this Court clarified that, when considering the reliability of diplomatic assurances, it “will assess …. whether the assurances are specific or are general and vague …. whether the assurances concern treatment which is legal or illegal in the receiving State …. whether they have been given by a Contracting State …. whether compliance with the assurances can be objectively verified through diplomatic or other monitoring mechanisms, including providing unfettered access to the applicant’s lawyers …. whether there is an effective system of protection against torture in the receiving State, including whether it is willing to cooperate with international monitoring mechanisms (including international human rights NGOs), and whether it is willing to investigate allegations of torture and to punish those responsible”.27 In some instances, the UN Human Rights Committee has rejected diplomatic assurances indicating that, to be acceptable, a monitoring mechanism would, at a minimum, have to a) begin to function promptly after the arrival of the concerned person in the destination State; b) allow private access to the detainee by an independent monitor; and c) allow for the availability of independent forensic and medical expertise, at any moment.28 For the Committee against Torture, the monitoring would have to be, “in fact and in the concerned person’s perception, objective, impartial and sufficiently trustworthy.”29 Even where such high levels of safeguards do apply, the former UN Special Rapporteur on Torture affirmed that, “diplomatic assurances with regard to torture are nothing but attempts to circumvent the absolute prohibition of torture and refoulement.”30 The ICJ supports the view of the Special Rapporteur and opposes reliance on diplomatic assurances against torture or other ill-treatment where any transfer would, in the absence of such assurances, violate the refoulement prohibition.31 In the extradition context, the use of diplomatic assurances has become common among States in the CIS region, in particular as regards ill-treatment of certain categories of “fugitives” from Central Asian States accused of serious offences, including of membership in or affiliation with “radical Islamist religious groups” that are listed as “terrorist or extremist” in their countries of origin.32 In Central Asian countries, such assurances are usually issued by the Prosecutor General’s Office.33 There is no official format for diplomatic assurances in the region, 34 but a mutually accepted and somewhat uniform format has developed. Commonly, assurances reiterate the countries’ common principles and rules on extradition, namely, double criminality and the rule of specialty. They often contain “guarantees” against the risk of torture or illtreatment, as well as commitments that defence rights or more broadly a fair trial, will be secured. The assurances may also sometimes include a statement that the prosecution of the individual concerned is not being sought on political grounds, and Judgment of 23 October 2008, para. 74; ; Ryabikin v. Russia, ECtHR, op. cit., para. 119; Makhmudzhan Ergashev v. Russia, ECtHR, Application No. 49747/11, 16 October 2012, paras. 74-76. 27 Othman (Abu Qatada) v. the United Kingdom, ECtHR, Application No. 8139/09, Judgment of 17 January 2012, para. 189 28 Alzery v. Sweden, CCPR, Communication No. 1416/2005, Views of 10 November 2006, para. 11.5; Zhakhongir Maksudov and Others v. Kyrgyzstan, CCPR, Communications Nos. 1461, 1462, 1476 & 1477/2006*, Views of 31 July 2008,paras. 12.512.6; Concluding Observations on Denmark, CCPR, UN Doc. CCPR/C/DNK/CO/5, 16 December 2008, para. 10. 29 Pelit v. Azerbaijan, CAT, Communication No. 281/2005, Views of 29 May 2007, para. 11. 30 Manfred Nowak, UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, Annual Report to the General Assembly, UN Doc. A/60/316, 30 August 2005 (Nowak Report 2005), para. 32. 31 See, ICJ, Assessing Damage, Urging Action, Report of the Eminent Jurist Panel on Terrorism, Counter-terrorism and Human Rights, 2009, pp.104-106 and 118-119; ICJ, Legal Commentary to the ICJ Berlin Declaration, 2008, pp.100-104. 32 See, Amnesty International, Return to Torture: Extraditions, Forcible Returns and Removals to Central Asia, 2013, Index: EUR 04/001/2013, p. 23. 33 In Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Belarus and Ukraine. 34 However, the Russian Supreme Court in its guidance on the application of Art.462 of the CPC by courts has indicated in its interpretation of the provisions of Art.462(3) that the assurances have to be indicated in the extradition request itself. The absence of such guarantees (assurances) is a barrier to granting a decision to extradite the wanted person (Bulletin of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, 2006, no.4, p.23), as cited in B.T. Bezlepkin, Commentary to the Criminal Procedure Code of the Russian Federation (itemized), 13th edition, Moscow, 2015, p.1106 4