CEDAW/C/68/D/91/2015 5.9 The author highlights the danger of such a narrow definition of domestic violence, which leads to a failure to provide protection for a large num ber of women. Recent amendments to the criminal legislation (art. 116 of the Criminal Code) put a limit to criminal liability for beatings of “close persons”, who include the husband or wife of a perpetrator and those who live in a common household. Thus, those women who for one reason or another prefer not to marry their partners and do not live with them are left without protection. Issues and proceedings before the Committee Consideration of admissibility 6.1 In accordance with rule 64 of its rules of procedure, the Committee must decide whether the communication is admissible under the Optional Protocol. Pursuant to rule 66, the Committee may decide to consider the admissibility of the communication together with its merits. In accordance with article 4 (2) (a) of the Optional Protocol, the Committee is satisfied that the same matter has not been and is not being examined under another procedure of international investigation or settlement. 6.2 The Committee recalls that, under article 4 (1) of the Optional Protocol, it is precluded from considering a communication unless it has ascertained that all available domestic remedies have been exhausted or that the application of such remedies is unreasonably prolonged or unlikely to bring effective reli ef. 6 In that connection, the Committee notes the State party’s argument that the communication should be declared inadmissible under that provision because the author failed to lodge a cassation appeal with the Supreme Court against the decision of the low er court of 21 February 2013 or the decision of the appellate court of 11 July 2013. In addition, the State party submits that the author ’s complaint against the decision by the police, dated 7 March 2013, to refuse to initiate a criminal case against K. w as repeatedly returned by the District Prosecutor ’s Office for additional investigation as premature and unsubstantiated. The Committee also notes the State party ’s submission that an internal investigation has been initiated by the police into the failure to carry out the actions demanded by the District Prosecutor ’s Office and the failure to investigate the author ’s complaints in due time. Nevertheless, the Committee notes the author ’s submission that she persistently complained to the District Court and the District Prosecutor about the inaction of the police and their refusal to initiate a criminal investigation and that, three years after her complaints, the police had still not initiated any investigation. 6.3 The Committee further notes that the author submitted new complaints on 20 and 21 May 2013 about further threats by K., which again resulted in a refusal by the same officer to initiate a criminal investigation. It also notes that no investigation was initiated after the District Prosecutor and t he District Court quashed the decision of the officer not to investigate the complaint. The Committee also notes that, between September 2013 and December 2014, the District Prosecutor’s Office ordered that the case materials should be returned for additio nal inquiry on five occasions and that the alleged perpetrator should be interrogated about the death threats sent to the author on 23 and 24 February 2013. In addition, on 3 June 2013, the District Court also found that the refusal by the officer to investigate the complaint was unlawful and unsubstantiated and ordered an additional inquiry. Nevertheless, the Committee also notes that on each occasion the officer responsible failed to locate and interrogate the alleged perpetrator and __________________ 6 8/12 See E.S. and S.C. v. United Republic of Tanzania (CEDAW/C/60/D/48/2013), para. 6.3, and L.R. v. Republic of Moldova (CEDAW/C/66/D/58/2013), para. 12.2. 17-21669