CCPR/C/123/D/2785/2016 Regulation for Execution, takes away the power of the State to commute death sentences. Therefore, the Government has clearly violated article 6 (4) of the Covenant. Issues and proceedings before the Committee Consideration of admissibility 8.1 Before considering any claim contained in a communication, the Committee must decide, in accordance with rule 93 of its rules of procedure, whether the communication is admissible under the Optional Protocol. 8.2 As required under article 5 (2) (a) of the Optional Protocol, the Committee must ascertain that the same matter is not being examined under another procedure of international investigation or settlement. The Committee notes the assertion of the State party that the same matters were raised in relation to Mr. Humaam’s case before the Human Rights Council special procedure mandate holders. The Committee refers to its jurisprudence 15 in which it has found that extra-conventional procedures or mechanisms established by the Human Rights Council, and whose mandates are to examine and report publicly on human rights situations in specific countries or territories or cases of widespread human rights violations worldwide, do not generally constitute an international procedure of investigation or settlement within the meaning of article 5 (2) (a) of the Optional Protocol. Accordingly, the Committee considers that it is not precluded from examining the present case under this provision. 8.3 The Committee notes the State party’s objection regarding the non-exhaustion of domestic remedies on the ground that the mediation process is effective and available until the day of execution. It also notes the author’s reply that, since the court did not take Mr. Ali’s family’s request to halt the execution into account, the mediation process is rendered ineffective and, in any case, has been unreasonably prolonged, rendering domestic remedies ineffective. The Committee further notes the author’s claims that the new rules on clemency are opaque as to the President’s discretion and the Supreme Court’s powers, and that they are discriminatory and thus ineffective. It further notes the State party’s argument that the rules on clemency are clear and are in accordance with sharia. 8.4 The Committee considers that clemency is a discretionary remedy, which does not need to be exhausted for the purposes of the Optional Protocol. It further notes that the clemency process works in tandem with the mandatory mediation procedure under sharia, and notes the lack of clear information about the ability of the President and the Supreme Court to grant or uphold clemency in the face of mediation in cases involving intentional killing, as well as the lack of clear information about the nature of the regulatory changes in this regard. The Committee considers that, under these circumstances, the State party has not demonstrated that the mediation process constitutes an available and effective remedy, and that it is not precluded by article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol from proceeding to a consideration of the merits of the present communication. 8.5 The Committee takes note of the State party’s argument that the communication is inadmissible since it was submitted to the Committee by a third party and not by the alleged victim himself. In this respect, the Committee recalls that rule 96 (b) of its rules of procedure provides that a communication should normally be submitted by the individual personally or by that individual’s representative, but that a communication submitted on behalf of any alleged victim may be accepted when it appears that the individual in question is unable to submit the communication personally. In the present case, the Committee notes that the alleged victim was detained on death row, that the communication was submitted on behalf of the alleged victim by his father and his counsel, who have presented a duly signed letter of authorization and a power of attorney from the alleged victim for the 15 10 See Djebrouni and Berzig v. Algeria, para. 7.2, Bashasha and Bashasha v. the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (CCPR/C/100/D/1776/2008), para. 6.2, and Celis Laureano v. Peru (CCPR/C/51/D/540/1993), para. 7.1.