CCPR/C/122/D/2753/2016 Consideration of the merits 8.1 The Committee has considered the present communication in the light of all the information made available to it by the parties, as required under article 5 (1) of the Optional Protocol. 8.2 The issue before the Committee is whether the removal of the author and his minor, autistic son to China would amount to a violation by the State party of its obligations under articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant. 8.3 The Committee recalls paragraph 12 of its general comment No. 31 (2004) on the nature of the general legal obligation imposed on States parties to the Covenant, in which it refers to the obligation of States parties not to extradite, deport, expel or otherwise remove a person from their territory where there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of irreparable harm, such as that contemplated in articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant. The Committee has also indicated that the risk must be personal 14 and that the threshold for providing substantial grounds to establish that a real risk of irreparable harm exists is high.15 Thus, all relevant facts and circumstances must be considered, including the general human rights situation in the author’s country of origin.16 The Committee further recalls that considerable weight should be given to the assessment conducted by the authorities of States parties and that it is generally for the organs of the States parties to the Covenant to review and evaluate facts and evidence in order to determine whether such a risk exists, 17 unless it is found that the evaluation was clearly arbitrary or amounted to a denial of justice.18 8.4 In that regard, the Committee notes that the author fears being arrested and possibly sentenced to life imprisonment or death penalty, and subjected to renewed torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment if he were returned to China, as he had worked secretly for many years to introduce democracy in China and had been an active member of the unrecognized Meixin Christian Church. Moreover, the Committee notes the author’s claim that the State party has not duly investigated, in the context of his credibility assessment, the allegations and signs of torture he had previously endured; his family’s dissidence, including his sisters’ escape and refugee status in Denmark; his participation in demonstrations against China and his membership of a Mormon Church while in Denmark; and the risks he has faced since 2012. In particular, he has claimed that the Board did not undertake any examination of available evidence before its first and second rejection of his claim, such as: (a) considering the information on the website of the Meixin Church, which the author had co-edited; (b) calling his older sister as a witness; or (c) granting the author the requested medical examination for signs of previous torture. 8.5 The Committee notes the State party’s argument that the author’s claims with respect to articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant should be considered as manifestly unfounded since the author has not sufficiently established that he would face a real and personal risk of irreparable harm, such as that contemplated in articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant, if returned to China. The Committee also notes the State party’s submission that no new substantial information was provided in the author’s communication. However, it notes that the State party did not question the author’s general credibility, but only pointed to the limited likelihood of several of the author’s statements. The Committee further observes that the Board considered as a fact that: (a) the author had engaged in the pro-democracy movement; (b) the author had attracted adverse attention of the authorities mainly related to activities involving overcharging at the State company, which had generated funds which 14 15 16 17 18 12 See communications No. 2007/2010, X v. Denmark (CCPR/C/110/D/2007/2010), para. 9.2; and No. 692/1996, A.R.J. v. Australia (CCPR/C/60/D/692/1996), para. 6.6. See X v. Denmark (footnote 14 above), para. 9.2; and communication No. 1833/2008, X v. Sweden, (CCPR/C/103/D/1833/2008), para. 5.18. See, for example, X v. Denmark (footnote 14 above), para. 9.2; and X. v. Sweden (footnote 15 above), para. 5.18. See communications No. 1763/2008, Pillai et al. v. Canada (CCPR/C/101/D/1763/2008) para. 11.4; and No. 1957/2010, Z.H. v. Australia (CCPR/C/107/D/1957/2010), para. 9.3. See, inter alia, ibid. and communication No. 541/1993, Simms v. Jamaica (CCPR/C/53/D/541/1993), para. 6.2.