12 one of policy’.13 In making this observation he was able to depart from the reasoning in earlier cases, referred to above, which had placed their emphasis only on the relevance and reliability of the evidence. He thus held that proof of an involuntary pointing out by an accused person is inadmissible even if something relevant to the charge is discovered as a result thereof.14 [24] Evidence of statements emanating from third parties, unless confirmed through oral testimony, was excluded as hearsay. And when those persons did testify, the question whether they had been ill-treated or improperly induced to make statements was relevant only to the weight of their evidence, not its admissibility. I am not aware of any case where evidence of a third party’s statement was held inadmissible because it was illegally obtained. [25] I return to s 35(5) of the Constitution. In S v Tandwa15 Cameron JA observed the clear and unmistakable departure from the pre-constitutional approach to the exclusion of improperly obtained in these terms: ‘The notable feature of the Constitution’s specific exclusionary provision is that it does not provide for automatic exclusion of unconstitutionally obtained evidence. Evidence must be excluded only if it (a) renders the trial unfair; or (b) is otherwise detrimental to the administration of justice. This entails that admitting impugned evidence could damage the administration of justice in ways that would leave the fairness of the trial intact: but where admitting the evidence renders the trial itself unfair, the administration of justice is always damaged. Differently put, evidence must be excluded in all cases where its admission is detrimental to the administration of 13 1994 (2) SACR 801 (A) at 807g-h. See generally D T Zeffertt, A P Paizes and A St Q Skeen The South African Law of Evidence (2003) p 500-505. 15 [2007] SCA 34 (RSA) para 116. 14