CCPR/C/115/D/2474/2014 4.15 Concerning the merits of the communication, the State party considers that it has not violated article 7 of the Covenant and responds to each of the author’s arguments in this regard. First, with regard to the author’s claim that the Court of Appeals should not have deemed that the date of the last administrative decision should determine the relevant facts most central to its judicial review, the State party considers that the Court’s position is a “logical consequence of the separation of powers in Norway’s constitutional order”. The State party recalls that article 7 of the Covenant is “not per se intended to supersede domestic constitutional constructs”. Moreover, the State party cites the Court’s statement that if the author wished to invoke new facts as a ground for a residence permit and protection against refoulement, he was able to do so by filing a petition for reversal to the immigration authorities. The State party notes that this procedure is common and that the Immigration Appeals Board is under an obligation to consider such requests. Furthermore, while the Court viewed 15 December 2011 as the “cut-off point for relevant facts”, it simultaneously, in the very same sentence, made clear that “evidence submitted at a later date” was to be emphasized “if it sheds light on the actual situation at the time of the decision”. Therefore, facts arising after 15 December 2011 were not excluded from the review of the Court of Appeals. In fact, the Court’s judgement clearly shows that facts arising after 15 December 2011 were indeed taken into account. Concerning the author’s reference to the judgement of the European Court of Human Rights in Saadi v. Italy (stating that the relevant time of examination of facts will be that of the proceedings before the Court), the State party observes that it is not aware of any similar reasoning adopted by the Committee. It further considers that the factual circumstances of the Saadi case are materially different from those of the present case. In the Saadi case, the domestic authorities had not considered the applicant’s case relating to his potential refoulement when the European Court examined it. In a situation where domestic courts have not considered an individual’s request not to be deported under the non-refoulement obligation at the time the case comes before an international tribunal, that tribunal obviously has to consider the individual’s case as it is presented at the time of the tribunal’s assessment, which is the only remedy available against deportation in violation of the non-refoulement obligation. In the present case, however, the domestic courts did assess the author’s claim of a potential violation of the non-refoulement obligation. The State party further considers that although the author relies on the judgement of the European Court in F.G. v. Sweden, the judgement does not support the author’s assertion that the European Court adheres to a general principle of giving asylum seekers the “benefit of the doubt”. 4.16 Second, with regard to the author’s claim that the Norwegian courts failed to “correctly apply the principle of the benefit of the doubt”, the State party considers that there is no factual basis for this claim, inasmuch as domestic courts do not adhere to a higher evidentiary threshold for Afghan converts as compared to other asylum seekers. In the author’s case, the Court of Appeal applied the standard of proof according to which it is “sufficient that the invoked grounds for asylum are seen as being reasonably probable”. The State party disagrees with the author’s suggestion that the Court adopted a higher evidentiary threshold. 4.17 Third, concerning the author’s assertion that the Court of Appeals erred in its assessment of the genuineness of the author’s conversion, the State party considers that there is no basis for the author’s argument that the Court ascribed “decisive weight” to the author’s personal reflection on his conversion and its consequences. In any case, the State party considers that any error in this regard does not constitute a violation of article 7 of the Covenant. The Committee has consistently held that it is for domestic courts to review and evaluate facts and evidence when assessing potential violations of article 7, unless it is 11