CCPR/C/115/D/2474/2014 also notes that the State party did not challenge the author’s argument concerning the nonpreclusive effect of the decision of the European Court. The Committee therefore considers that it is not precluded by article 5 (2) (a) of the Optional Protocol from examining the communication. 6.3 The Committee takes note of the author’s claim that the State party violated his rights under article 2 (3) of the Covenant when the Immigration Appeals Board issued a letter dated 28 August 2014 indicating that the State party is unwilling to provide him with non-refoulement protection despite knowledge of facts substantiating his need for such protection. The Committee recalls that article 2 (3) can be invoked by individuals only in conjunction with other articles of the Covenant and cannot, in and of itself, give rise to a claim under the Optional Protocol.11 The Committee therefore considers that it is precluded by article 2 of the Optional Protocol from examining this part of the communication. 6.4 The Committee notes that the State party does not raise any issues concerning the admissibility of the author’s claim under article 7. Accordingly, the Committee declares this claim admissible and proceeds to consideration of the merits. Consideration of the merits 7.1 The Committee has considered the communication in the light of all the information made available to it by the parties, as provided for under article 5 (1) of the Optional Protocol. 7.2 The Committee notes the author’s claim that he would face ill-treatment if he were removed to Afghanistan due to his Christian beliefs. It also notes the State party’s observations that the Borgarting Court of Appeals, while not disputing that Christians face persecution in Afghanistan, was not satisfied that the author had genuinely converted to Christianity as of 15 December 2011, when the Board denied the author’s second request for reversal of the Board’s decision rejecting his appeal of the decision of the Directorate of Immigration on his asylum application. 7.3 The Committee recalls its general comment No. 31 in which it refers to the obligation of States parties not to extradite, deport, expel or otherwise remove a person from their territory when there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of irreparable harm such as that contemplated by articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant. 12 The Committee has also indicated that the risk must be personal13 and that there is a high threshold for providing substantial grounds to establish that a real risk of irreparable harm exists.14 Thus, all relevant facts and circumstances must be considered, including the general human rights situation in the author’s country of origin. 15 11 12 13 14 15 14 452/1991, Glaziou v. France, decision of inadmissibility of 18 July 1994, para. 7.2 (communication inadmissible under article 5 (2) (a) of the Optional Protocol because the European Commission had already found the same matter to be inadmissible as manifestly ill-founded); communication No. 121/1982, A.M. v. Denmark, decision of inadmissibility of 23 July 1982, paras. 4 and 5 (communication inadmissible under article 5 (2) (a) of the Optional Protocol because the European Commission had already found the same matter to be inadmissible as manifestly ill-founded). See, inter alia, communication No. 1961/2010, X v. Czech Republic, decision of inadmissibility adopted on 2 April 2015, para. 6.6. See general comment No. 31 (2004) on the nature of the general legal obligation imposed on States parties to the Covenant, para. 12. See, inter alia, communication No. 2393/2014, K. v. Denmark, Views adopted on 16 July 2015, para. 7.3; communications No. 2272/2013, P.T. v. Denmark, Views adopted on 1 April 2015, para. 7.2; and No. 2007/2010, X v. Denmark, Views adopted on 26 March 2014, para. 9.2. See X v. Denmark, para. 9.2 and communication No. 1833/2008, X v. Sweden, Views adopted on 1 November 2011, para. 5.18. See X v. Denmark, para. 9.2 and X v. Sweden, para. 5.18.